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INTRODUCTION
After a long, hot summer weekend, Andy, Barney, and Goober
meet for breakfast at the local eatery.! They look at each other, then
at the other patrons, all looking at them strangely, the looks varying
from the quizzical to the overtly hostile. Their favorite waitress
waltzes past them with a steaming coffee pot, ignoring their smiles
and empty cups. The silent treatment continues for a couple of min-
utes until a local retiree pushes himself back from one of the counter
stools, hitches his belt, and tosses the morning daily in the middle of
the table. "You boys seen this?"
Andy, Barney, and Goober read the headline in bold two inch
print letters: TOWN POLICE FORCE CHARGED WITH ASSISTING
AL-QAIDA CELL. Speechless, they read the story. The source is a
local in his early twenties with a known history of substance abuse,
abusive relationships with women, racist beliefs, psychiatric difficul-
ties, and a record of petty crimes and one perjury conviction. He
claims to have seen uniformed officers with Mayberry insignia in the
woods training two locals of Middle Eastern ancestry to use "a variety
of demolition devices used by al-Qaida operatives." The alleged ter-
rorists-Frank and Fred Haddad, third generation Lebanese-
Americans who run a profitable local chicken farm--are named. The
police officers are not.
Barney looks at Andy and Goober and they look at him, stunned
fawns in a hunter's headlights. "Can the paper do this? Can he?"
Andy shrugs, Goober stares into his empty cup, slack-jawed. Finally,
Regents Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky Univer-
sity; Columbia University, LL.M (1973); Saint Louis University, J.D. (1972); Bellarmine Univer-
sity, A.B. (1969).
t The author has taken literary license with the Mayberry hypothetical. Apparently, Goober
served as a deputy only on Halloween so he could guard the cannon in the park.
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Andy stands. "We need to go get us a lawyer." The others follow. No
one in the eatery has said a word-people who have known them
their entire lives, people who have greeted them and joked with them
every morning. Mayberry is hit with a scandal implicating police offi-
cers-"public officials," a suspect source with as little believability as
Saddam Hussein,' and heinous accusations. The common law and
the First Amendment should provide a remedy. Do they? For the
Haddad brothers, yes. They are identified and are likely only private
persons.2 For Andy, Barney and Goober, no, not if their state follows
the Supreme Court of Virginia, which rejected the small group defa-
mation theory in Dean v. Dearing.'
The common law, public policy, common sense, fundamental
fairness, and the First Amendment justify a finding that the all inclu-
sive defamatory statements above suffice to inculpate and identify
each of the unnamed members of the small group, the Mayberry po-
lice department. If 9/11 taught us anything, it taught us about the
extraordinary heroism expected and given without qualm by Amer-
ica's finest, in large forces and small. Mayberry's finest deserve bet-
ter. So did Officer Donald Dean. This Article will demonstrate this
proposition by analyzing the prevailing law in the following sections:
I. The Supreme Court, "Of and Concerning" and the Specter of Se-
ditious Libel; II. The Seditious Libel Analogy and Suits by Govern-
ment and Governmental Actors-Lower Court Precedent; and III.
Dean v. Dearing and the "Of and Concerning" Requirement-A
Wrong-headed Interpretation of First Amendment Doctrine.
I. THE SUPREME COURT, "OF AND CONCERNING," AND THE SPECTER OF
SEDITIOUS LIBEL
An analysis of the Supreme Court's defamation precedent prior
to4 the advent of the constitutional revolution5 wrought by New York
Cf St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) (noting that recklessness may be
found where "there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy
of his reports").
Garden variety small business owners are usually considered private persons under the
First Amendment. See DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER'S GUIDE § 5:19, at 151-60
(2003).
3 561 S.E.2d 686, 687-90 (Va. 2002).
Justice White noted the Court's pre-1964 precedent "unmistakably revealed that the clas-
sic law of libel was firmly in place." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 384 (1974)
(White, J., dissenting).
5 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 158 (1979) (noting civil and criminal liability were
"well established in the common law when the First Amendment was adopted" and the "prevail-
ing jurisprudence" prior to New York Times was that libel was not protected by the First Amend-
ment); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 384-89 (explaining that the "consistent view" prior to 1964 was that
defamation was "wholly unprotected by the First Amendment"; the Court in New York Times
adopted one side of the controversy over whether the First Amendment was intended to pro-
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Times Co. v. Sullivan' is quite revealing. The Court was exceedingly
protective of the reputations of victims, both reaffirming the publica-
don at peril doctrine of the common law9 and repudiating lower
court attempts to remove discretion over interpretation of ambiguous
statements from the jury. 0 In two cases, the Court dealt with "of and
concerning" issues." In Peck v. Tribune Co. it held that the use of the
plaintiff's picture accompanied by a statement and a name, though
not hers, sufficed to imply that she was the named person and had
made the statement, despite the attached name of the actual en-
dorser. 2 In Baker v. Warner it tacitly affirmed it was sufficient that
plaintiff was identified by his governmental office, district attorney.
The Court also upheld a criminal group defamation law in Beauharnais
scribe seditious libel); NewYork Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 299-300 (1964) (Goldberg,
J., concurring) (noting the Court was deciding on "a clean slate"); DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 414
A.2d 806, 811 (R.I. 1980) (noting that the Supreme Court "introduced an innovative and un-
precedented constitutional gloss" on the common law of defamation in New York Times); Harry
Kalven,Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note On "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"1964
Sup. CT. REv. 191, 221 n.125 (concurring with Alexander Meiklejohn's comment that the case
was "an occasion for dancing in the streets").
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1919) (providing for the
favorable jury instructions to the plaintiff explained in Peck); Baker v. Warner, 231 U.S. 588, 594
(1913) (leaving to the jury the question whether ambiguous language is libelous); Nalle v. Oys-
ter, 230 U.S. 165, 179-82 (1913) (remanding the counts not barred by resjudicata for a deter-
mination of abuse of a common law privilege, i.e., "falsehood and the absence of probable
cause"); Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909) (applying the liberal standard that plain-
tiff could be defamed "in the estimation of an important and respectable part of the commu-
nity"); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 151-53 (1904) (upholding a criminal libel convic-
tion against Philippinojournalists); cf Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 227-38 (1875) (finding that
an accusation of fornication, although implying moral turpitude, did not constitute an indict-
able crime and thus was not actionable without proof of special damages). The general case law
has changed the latter holdings in a couple of respects. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
571 (1977) (asserting that a statement is slanderous per se if the crime is punishable by impris-
onment in a state or federal institution or involves "moral turpitude"); id. § 574 (noting that an
imputation of "serious sexual misconduct" is slanderous per se).
8 Herbert, 441 U.S. at 159 n.4 (quoting Peck); Washington Post, 250 U.S. at 293-94; Peck, 214
U.S. at 189.
9 For an extensive discussion of the impact of First Amendment doctrine on fault and falsity
after 1964, see ELDER, supra note 2, at chs. 3-9.
10 See Washington Post, 250 U.S. at 293-94; Baker, 231 U.S. at 594; Peck, 214 U.S. at 190.
11 The "of and concerning" standard requires that plaintiff demonstrate that a "reasonable
identification" of plaintiff with the defamatory matter exists, although plaintiff need not be
named-it suffices that those who know plaintiff or know of him or her "reasonably connect the
plaintiff to the defendant['s]" libel or slander "based on circumstances or facts of which the
recipient(s) has knowledge." SeeELDER, supra note 2, § 1:30, at 134-44 (citations omitted).
is Peck, 214 U.S. at 189.
13 Baker, 231 U.S. at 591.
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v. Illinois,14 based on the well documented history of criminal defama-
tion law directed at individuals.
15
In the famous decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan16 the Court
confronted a coordinated effort to squelch media criticism of official
opposition in the South to desegregation. 7 Rejecting any "talismanic
immunity"8 of libel from free expression restraints, the Court viewed
the case, involving "an expression of grievance and protest on one of
the major public issues of our time,"' against the backdrop of a pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 20 Constitution-
14 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
15 Id. at 254-58. Justice Brennan for the Court in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70
(1964), briefly noted Beauharnais and concluded that the Louisiana criminal defamation statute
was not such a "narrowly drawn" group vilification statute. Two members of the Court reaf-
firmed their view that Beauharnais was improperly decided. Id. at 79-80 (Black, J., joined by
Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 82 (Douglas, J., with Black, J., concurring) (contending that
Beauharnais was "decided by the narrowest of margins" and "should be overruled as a misfit in
our constitutional system and as out of line with the dictates of the First Amendment"). Beau-
harnais's status is still in dispute. Note that the "Skokie" case, which was denied certiorari by the
Supreme Court, held it was implicitly overruled by New York Times and its progeny. Collin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
with White, J, dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting the Seventh Circuit's decision is "in
some tension with Beauharnais," a case not "overruled or formally limited in any way"); see also
Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953, 953 (1978) (Blackmun,J., with Rehnquist, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari) (noting similar concerns in the Court's rejection of a stay of mandate and
enforcement of the Seventh Circuit's decision). For other cases assuming Beauharnais is no
longer viable precedent, see Tollett v. U.S., 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 n.14 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267, 1277-78 (D. Md. 1974); Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith. v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., concurring). See also RODNEY
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:67 (2d ed. 2003) ("Sweeping prohibitions on hate speech,
patterned on the group libel notions of Beauharnais, are unconstitutional.").
16 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17 See id. at 294-95 (Black, J., concurring) (describing this effort as a "technique for harass-
ing and punishing" the press and that eleven libel suits were pending against petitioner and five
more against CBS); Kalven, supra note 5, at 200 ("[T]he inescapable impression is
that... Alabama somehow pounced on this opportunity to punish the Times for its role in sup-
porting the civil rights movement in the South. The judgment... represented a powerful blow
in the South's counterattack.").
18 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269. The Court rejected dicta to the contrary in prior cases.
See also Kalven, supra note 5, at 201. Note that Alabama adopted a "truth in all its particulars"
defense. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279. The Court rejected any such limited truth defense as
inconsistent with the First Amendment. Id. The Court also noted that the respondent's claim
that the insignificant inaccuracies sufficed for damages to reputation "may itself raise constitu-
tional problems." Id. at 289. But compare the analysis of Harry Kalven,Jr., who noted the truth
defense's strict standards, but said: "[T]he conclusion that the falsity of the statements was
harmless would not comport with established legal tests." Kalven, supra note 5, at 200 (citation
omitted). Later, Justice Brennan correctly noted what was implicit in New York Times, stating
that the First Amendment "absolutely prohibits punishment of truthful criticism," at least as
regards matters of public interest. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 78; see also infra note 418 (discussing the
burden of proving falsity and truth issues).
W New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271.
20 Id. at 270.
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alizing the minority variant of the common law "fair comment" doc-
trine, the Court superimposed on state law a free expression-based
2
1
requirement of "actual malice"24-knowing or reckless disregard of
falsity2-by evidence of "convincing clarity,, 26 a qualified constitu-
tional privilege27 limiting suits by "public officials, 28 defamed as to
their "official conduct."
2 9
21 Alabama's "fair comment" version, reflecting the majority view, protected only opinions
based on true facts. Id. at 267.
22 See id. at 280 n.20 (noting this was the "consensus of scholarly opinion").
23 The co-petitioners were four individual black Alabama clergymen whose names were used
in the advertisement apparently without their consent. Id. at 256-57, 260. The Court clearly
based its holding on both free speech and press grounds. See id. at 256, 264 & n.4, 266, 268, 282
(referring to a "citizen-critic of government"); id. at 298, 304 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (speak-
ing of the immunity of a "citizen and the press"); see also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84
(1966) (treating a regular but unpaid columnist as shielded by the "constitutional protections
afforded free expression" established in New York Times); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74 (noting the
"constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression" in a criminal libel prosecution of a prose-
cutor for statements at a press conference). For a more detailed analysis, see ELDER, supra note
2, § 7:4, at 77-78, suggesting that Chief Justice Burger's casual statement in Hutchinson v. Prox-
mire was clearly at odds with Court precedent and the steadfast position of lower courts. See
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134 n.16 (1979) (stating that the Court had "never de-
cided the question" of New York Times'application in the non-media context).
24 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The term "actual malice" precipitated major confu-
sion. The Court disavowed the term in favor of its definition, stating it "can confuse as well as
enlighten." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 511 (1991). For purposes of
this paper the author substitutes constitutional malice. Note that the Court treated this as a
"fair equivalent" of executive official immunity, citing the absolute immunity given all federal
officials within the "outer perimeter" of their employment. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573-
75 (1959). The Court also noted comparable immunity given by states to high ranking officials,
but conceded some gave only a qualified immunity to lower officials. New York Times, 376 U.S.
at 282-83. In a later opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court took pains to disentangle the New
York Times rule from the vagaries of any correlation to Barr. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 84-85 n.10.
This was wise, as linkage to the varying absolute or qualified privileges applicable to lower rank-
ing state officials under the divided precedent would create an arbitrary and artificial variation
in plaintiff requirements in libel actions from state to state. See David Elder, Defamation, Public
Officialdom and the Rosenblatt v. Baer Criteria-A Proposal for Revivification: Two Decades After New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 579, 591 n.49 (1984).
25 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court also adopted an "independent examina-
tion" standard for Court review. Id. at 285-88. The Court noted that constitutional malice was
the antithesis of "good faith." Id. at 286-87. For a detailed analysis of constitutional malice, see
ELDER, supra note 2, ch. 7.
26 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86. It is not clear whether the Court intended to endorse
an enhanced evidentiary standard. Justice Brennan transformed it into a formal clear and con-
vincing evidence burden in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (plurality opin-
ion). This standard is now established law. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1,
15 (1990); ELDER, supra note 2, § 7:5. The two phrases, "clear and convincing" and "convincing
clarity," are used interchangeably. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773
(1986); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 & n.30,
512, 514 & n.31 (1984). However, the Court expressly left open whether the "clear and con-
vincing" standard applies tofalsity in a case by a public plaintiff. Harte-Hanks Communications,
Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 661 n.2 (1989); see also ELDER, supra note 2, § 7:5, at 80-84.
27 The Court's decision on the merits was unanimous. Three Justices concurred on absolute
privilege grounds. Aew York Times, 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., with Douglas,J., concurring) (stat-
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The above so-called "New York Times" or "Sullivan" constitutional
malice rule was not, however, the only basis for finding a constitu-
tional deficiency in Alabama libel law. The Court found a second de-
fect in the state courts' application of the "of and concerning" or col-
loquium30 element of plaintiffs prima facie case.3  Affirming the
dramatic doctrine espoused in City of Chicago v. Tribune Co.52-"no
court of last resort in this country has ever held, or even suggested,
that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the
American system of jurisprudence"S5 -the Court held that the Ala-
bama courts had impermissibly attempted to "sidestep this obstacle by
transmuting criticism of government, however impersonal it may
ing that malice is "an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove" and thus
still allowing suits only provides "an evanescent protection"); id. at 297-305 (Goldberg, J., with
Douglas, J., concurring). For similar absolutist views, see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 575 (1968) (Douglas, J., with Black, J., concurring on the same grounds); Rosenblatt, 383
U.S. at 94-95 (Black, J., with Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting) (following their concur-
rences in New York Times and Garrison); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1965) (per cu-
iam) (Black, J., with Douglas, J., and Goldberg, J., concurring) (basing decision on their opin-
ions in New York Times and Garrison); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 79-80 (Black, J., with Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 80-83 (Douglas, J., with Black, J., concurring); id. at 88 (Goldberg, J., con-
curring).
28 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256, 264, 268, 275, 279, 282-83, 292 n.30. Sullivan was one of
three elected councilmen and testified he was the commissioner of public safety in charge of
the police. Clearly, he was a "public official." The Court noted the Barr analogy but noted it
had "no occasion" to decide "how far down into the lower ranks of government employees" the
designation of "public official" status would extend. Id. at 283 n.23. It resolved this by adopting
general criteria in Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85-86. See discussion infra note 145.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256, 264, 268, 273, 279, 282-83. As to the "official conduct"
criterion, the Court did not have to decide the precise boundaries but concluded that, if the
charges referred to Sullivan at all, they implicated his official responsibilities. Id. at 283 n.23.
The Court later expanded it to "anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office,"
including matters impugning both public and private character, such as "dishonesty, malfea-
sance, or improper motivation." Garrison, 379 U.S. at 77. For a detailed analysis, see ELDER,
supra note 2, § 5:2, at 33-43; Elder, supra note 24, at 644-59.
50 Colloquium refers to a defamation plaintiff's burden of pleading and proving that "the
defamatory meaning attached to him" in a case where, on its face, plaintiff is not named. W.
PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 783 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER
AND KEETON].
31 Although Justice Stewart once listed the "of and concerning" element as one upon which
plaintiff had the evidentiary burden of "convincingly clear" evidence, Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (StewartJ. dissenting), there is otherwise no basis in Court precedent for
this proposition. But see Deaver v. Hinel, 391 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Neb. 1986) (adopting a "clear
and convincing" standard without analysis or discussion). In fact, the well established prepon-
derance standard clearly applies. See infra notes 346-47. The Court approved in one of its
more recent public person libel cases a set of instructions adopting a preponderance standard
as to the "defamatory toward the plaintiff" issue. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., 491 U.S. at
661 n.2.
32 139 N.E. 86 (I11. 1923).
33 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 291 (quoting City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. at 88).
For a detailed analysis of libel on governmental entities, see the text supported by infra notes
187-231.
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seem on its face, into personal criticism, and hence potential libel, of
the officials of whom the government is composed."34 The Court's
analysis left it ambiguous, however, whether this aspect of the case
adopted an absolute prohibition or merely barred liability as to the
"good-faith critic of government."3 5
The Court's evocative and eloquent reliance on the no-libel-of-
government analogy should not and cannot camouflage the very lim-
ited nature of the Court's holding, which rejects the attenuated link-
age relied on by Sullivan in claiming he was libeled. A close examina-
tion of the full-page advertisement, entitled "Heed Their Rising
Voices, 36 demonstrates convincingly the juantum stretch the Ala-
bama courts made in finding colloquium.3 The introductory para-
graph referenced the peaceful demonstrations of Southern blacks "in
positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity" under the
Constitution, who were encountering "an unprecedented wave of terror
by those who would deny and negate that document."'' Paragraph
three, the basis for Sullivan's first claim, came next and read as fol-
lows:
34 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 292.
35 Id. ("[R]aising as it does the possibility that a good-faith critic of government will be penalized
for his criticism, the proposition ... strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected
area of free expression." (emphasis added)). This qualified privilege implication was rein-
forced by footnote 30, where the Court extended the common law doctrine of fair comment,
"[i]nsofar as the proposition means only that the statements ... implicitly criticiz[ed] his ability
to run the Police Department." Id. at 292 n.30 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 607 (1938)).
The Court then ended the footnote with the following:
Since the Fourteenth Amendment requires recognition of the conditional privilege for honest
misstatements of fact, it follows that a defense of fair comment must be afforded for honest
expression of opinion based upon privileged, as well as true, statements of fact. Both defenses
are of course defeasible if the public official proves actual malice, as was not done here.
Id. (emphasis added). Note that the "good faith critic" language may not be inadvertent. In its
analysis of the absence of constitutional malice, the Court used the same "good faith" language
as the antithesis of constitutional malice. Id. at 286-87. "The entire posture of the case
does... bespeak an absolute immunity from defamation liability for the critic of government,
rather than the New York Times qualified privilege for the critic of governors .... " Elder, supra
note 24, at 584 n.20. One court interpreted this "good faith" language (not altogether convinc-
ingly) as "at first, puzzling." Mullins v. Brando, 91 Cal. Rptr. 796, 801 n.7 (1970).
Such critics should prevail even if their defamatory utterance singles out the plaintiff by
name. They do not speak with "actual malice." The explanation lies.., in a quirk of the
common law of defamation. As far as the identity of the person defamed is concerned, it
is a tort of strict liability .... A defendant may be in entire good faith when launching an
"impersonal attack on governmental operations." Thus he may accuse, on adequate
though erroneous information, the police of a particular city of habitually rousting Ne-
groes. Yet if by some "legal alchemy" the state may transform such an impersonal attack
into a personal attack on the chief of police, the chief may quite easily be able to prove
that as to him personally the plaintiff spoke with a reckless disregard for the truth.
Id.
36 New York Times, 376 U.S. at app. (reprinting Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
1960, at L25).
57 See infra text accompanying notes 39-74.
38 New York Times, 376 U.S. at app. (emphasis added).
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"In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang 'My Country, 'Tis of
Thee' on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school,
and truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear gas ringed the Ala-
bama State College Campus. When the entire student body protested to
state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked. . . ,,39
in an attempt to starve them into submission.
The fourth paragraph listed by name eight major Southern cities
and made reference to "a host of other cities in the South"0 where
"young American teenagers, in face of the entire weight of official state
apparatus and police power, have boldly stepped forth as protagonists of
democracy. 4 The fifth paragraph began with repetition of the same
introductory words, a standard literary device for emphasis. The
paragraph read:
"Small wonder that the Southern violators of the Constitution fear this
new, non-violent brand of freedom fighter.... Small wonder that they are
determined to destroy the one man who... symbolizes the new spirit
now sweeping the South-the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., world-
famous leader of the Montgomery Bus Protest."
42
The sixth paragraph, containing the second libel complained of,
picked up on the indeterminate "Southern violators 43 rubric:
"Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's
peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his
home almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person.
They have arrested him several times-for 'speeding,' 'loitering,' and
similar 'offenses.' And now they have charged him with 'perjury'-a felony
under which they could imprison him for ten years."44
Although not mentioned as part of the claimed libel, the "Southern
violators" repetition was continued in the remainder of the para-
graph. "Obviously, their real purpose is to remove him [Dr. King]
physically as the leader.., and thereby to intimidate all leaders who
may rise in the South. Their strategy is to behead this affirmative
movement, and thus to demoralize Negro Americans and weaken
their will to struggle."
4 5
The last sentence of paragraph six, paragraph seven and three
short ending paragraphs starting with the repetitive "We" ("We must
heed their rising voices-yes-but we must add our own," "We must
extend ourselves above and beyond moral support and render the
material help so urgently needed .... We urge you to join hands with
9 Id. at 257, app. (emphasis added).
40 Id. at app.
41 Id. (emphasis added).
42 Id. (emphasis added).
43 Id.
4 Id. at 257-58, app. (emphasis added except "felony" and "ten years").
45 Id. at app.
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our fellow Americans in the South .... ") explicitly solicited aid in
support of Dr. King, demonstrating students and the right-to-vote
campaign in response to this broad-based attack by "the Southern vio-
lators,"' both within and without government.
In sum, the "we" versus "they" advertisement was a call for mate-
rial arms against an oppositionist culture's "unprecedented wave of ter-
ror,"4 7 and a group libel with an exceptionally broad swathe-"the en-
tire weight of official state apparatus and police power '4s  but hardly
limited thereto. Justice Black, himself a native Alabamian, recog-
nized that the background of the case was the "widespread hostility to
desegregation, 49 arising from the "efforts of many people, even in-
cluding some public officials,"5 to retain state-mandated segregation
in public schools and public arenas and the "feelings of hostility"5' di-
rected at the eastern press, the "outside agitators" 52 exemplified by
the petitioner.
Reading the advertisement as a whole, the Court could have con-
cluded that the advertisement was reasonably construable only as ap-
plying to a large and indefinite class of "Southern violators.' 4 This
was particularly true of paragraph six, with its lack of explicit geo-
graphical focus and its fungible use of "Southern violators," "they"
and "their.,5  As to both libel claims, the Court seemed to recognize
the respondent's difficulty in distinguishing himself from the other
"Southern violators," noting that several of the claims-the dining
hall padlocking, the bombing of Dr. King's home, the assault on his
person, and the perjury prosecution-involved non-police actors56 (i.e.,
other "Southern violators").
46 Id. at app.
47 Id.
48 Id.; see also Kalven, supra note 5, at 198.
It would seem more reasonable to assume that the "they" referred to in the [sixth] para-
graph was intended to suggest no specific persons but rather the "Establishment" in
which the plaintiff's role would be only incidental. Indeed, both paragraphs would seem
to be concerned with such an amorphous group rather than individuals such as the
plaintiff.
Id.
49 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 294 (Black, J., concurring).
0 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.; see also infra note 268 (providing an interesting example of an earlier parallel rural-
versus-big-city contretemps on race in Kentucky).
53 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 294. This hostility was reflected in the jury's half-million dollar
award in the absence of proof of actual damage. Justice Black said, "[v]iewed realistically," the
record suggested Sullivan's fame and finances were probably magnified by the advertisement.
Id.
54Id. at app.
5 Id. at app.
Id. at 288. Even Sullivan testified that the alleged aspersions reflected on him, his co-
commissioners, "and the community." Id. at 289-90 & n.28, 292.
May 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Court did not have to definitively resolve the broader issue of
whether the advertisement could be reasonably construed only as a
broad criticism of an oppositionist Southern culture17 because the
Alabama courts had adopted a type of "captain-of-the-ship"' vicarious
responsibility, where respondent's position as commissioner of public
safety sufficed to defame him when statements condemned the agency
of which he had hierarchical supervisory responsibility.59 The "truck-
loads of police... ringed" (paragraph three) and that "[the police]
ha[d] arrested [Dr. King] seven times" (paragraph six) did not con-
tain "even an oblique reference "6° to Sullivan as an individual. Ac-
cordingly, support for the "asserted reference" had to be found in
witness testimony.6' However, Sullivan's testimony and that of his six
62witnesses shared this common fatal defect: Any belief that he was
portrayed as approving, directing, or otherwise personally implicated
was based "solely on the unsupported assumption that, because of his of-
ficial position, he must have been.., the bare fact of [Sullivan] 's offi-
cial position."63  In other words, it was this "captain of the ship"
57 The Court did note tersely as a preface to its vicarious responsibility analysis that the
statements could not "reasonably be read" as imputing "personal involvement in the acts in
question." Id. at 288-89. It could easily have stopped there.
DAN B. DOBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 382, 931-32 (2000) (discussing the vicarious liability
rule adopted by some jurisdictions to impute the negligence of a nurse or medical resident non-
emloyee to a surgeon with a purported right of "control").
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 267, 283 n.23. The Court quoted from the state supreme
court:
We think it common knowledge that the average person knows that municipal
agents, such as police and firemen, and others, are under the control and direction of
the city governing body, and more particularly under the direction and control of a sin-
gle commissioner. In measuring the performance or deficiencies of such groups, praise
or criticism is usually attached to the official in complete control of the body.
Id. at 263, 291 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 39 (Ala. 1962)).
60 New York Times, 376 U.S, at 289. Note that the Court conceded that the charges could be
construed as referring to "the police." Id.
61 Id. Note that the Court did not disallow such testimony per se. Indeed, it tacitly affirmed
its appropriateness in other cases not involving the atypical environment before it: "(N]one of
them suggested any basis for the belief... that respondent himself was attacked .... " Id. Spe-
cifically, the Court noted none of respondent's witnesses based their conclusions on "any state-
ments in the advertisement, and not on any evidence that he had in fact been so involved." Id.
Later, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, the Court reaffirmed that the "specter of prosecutions for libel on
government" was based on the supervisory-based "presumption alone." 383 U.S. 75, 81 (1966).
In the setting before it, the Court interpreted New York Times as mandating evidence that the
charge was interpreted by readers as "specifically directed" at plaintiff. Id. For a detailed analy-
sis, see infra notes 91-136 and accompanying text.
62 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 289 n.28.
63 Id. at 289-90 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Sullivan's inconsistent positions
were noted by Harry Kalven:
The gossamer thread on which defendant's liability depended was made thinner by
the fact that in order to show that the statements of fact were untrue, plaintiff had to re-
verse the logic by which he showed that the statements referred to him. On this aspect
of the case, he argued that the arrests of Dr. King, for example, occurred before his ten-
ure as commissioner and that as commissioner he had nothing to do with the perjury
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vicarious responsibility that had "disquieting implications for criti-
cism of 6Fovernmental conduct"6 4 under the no-libel-of-government
analogy.
Three aspects of the Court's opinion make it incontrovertibly
clear that it was not barring actions under the small group defamation
rule where plaintiff could demonstrate that he was one of a small
group tainted by a collective inclusive disparagement of a govern-
mental entity compromised of identifiable individuals who could
each claim reputational taint under the well-established rule of the
common law. 6r The Court specifically cited to and relied upon6 1 Pon-
der v. Cobbt8 as an exemplar of its constitutionalization of the minority
fair comment privilege. Later, in rejecting the "bare fact of [Sulli-
van's] official position,"69 the Court again juxtaposed and com-
pared-as not containing that fallacy-Ponder v. Cobb,7° involving cor-
respondence with the Governor imputing explicit7e ' election
misconduct in a named town precinct. The North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld the claim of the three unnamed but identifiable indi-
viduals known to or eminently knowable by the townspeople-the
election registrar and two election judges. Lastly, the Court in New
indictment. Therefore, he asserted, the statements were false as to him. There is re-
vealed here a new technique by which defamation might be endlessly manufactured.
First, it is argued that, contrary to all appearances, a statement referred to the plaintiff;
then, that it falsely ascribed to the plaintiff something that he did not do, which should
be rather easy to prove about a statement that did not refer to plaintiff in the first
place.... [T]he Court did not have to confront this logic, which remains temporarily
buried for resurrection at some later time.
Kalven, supra note 5, at 199.
64 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 291. Note that the New York Times issued a retraction upon the
demand of the governor, who claimed the advertisement charged him with "grave misconduct"
and "improper actions and omissions" as governor and ex officio chair of the State Board of
Education. Id. at 261. In a revealing admission as to why the retraction was given to him but
not to Sullivan, the secretary of the Times testified that the governor was deemed an "embodi-
ment" of the state and that further facts had demonstrated the advertisement referred to "the
action of the State authorities and the Board of Education presumably of which the Governor is
the ex-officio chairman." Id. at 262. By contrast, the same witness testified he did not view any
of the language in the advertisement as referring to Sullivan. Id.
" For a detailed analysis of subsequent precedent applying New York Times to suits by large
and small governmental entities, see infra Part II.
See infra text accompanying notes 238-368.
67 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280 n.20 (listing Ponder v. Cobb as the first case).
68 126 S.E.2d 67, 80 (N.C. 1962).
69 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 289-90.
70 Id. at 291 n.29.
71 Ponder, 126 S.E.2d at 69-71 (expressly imputing election fraud or "ballot-stuffing"). The
plaintiffs in Ponder testified, but not on the issue of "of and concerning." Their testimony was
directed at refuting defendant's charges. Id. at 72-73, 80-82.
72 The relevant correspondence made a number of charges. In the first letter, the only ref-
erences were to election fraud in the county generally and that the specific precinct where
plaintiffs worked had reported that fraud. Id. at 69. In the second letter there were similar ref-
erences to the county generally and to "ballot-stuffing" "results" in plaintiffs' precinct. The de-
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York Times unambiguously reaffirmed in general terms that witness
testimony could be used to establish the "of and concerning" element
even as to a purported libel not making even an "oblique reference"
to plaintiff by name or office-but could not be relied on therein as
to testimony based solely on vicarious linkage.73 However, the Court
did not mandate such in small group cases. Any suggestion it so in-
tended would be inconsistent with its references to Ponder v. Cobb.74
Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n,75 a second minority fair comment
decision relied on by New York Times,76 also applied common law "of
and concerning" rules. In that case plaintiff alleged he was both state
road commissioner and a member of the state road commission and,
as such, had purchased the "Silver Bridge" for the state. Although he
was never identified by name or position-the only references were
to the "Neely administration," "Neely Deal," "state officials," and
"state administration" 77-the Supreme Court of West Virginia found
no difficulty with plaintiffs allegation that the editorial imputed
scandalous misconduct or neglect of office 78 directly to him.
The continuing vitality post-New York Times of the traditional ap-
proach to "of and concerning" in the small group defamation setting
is convincingly evidenced by the Court's decision in the criminal
defamation case of Garrison v. Louisiana7 9 issued shortly thereafter. In
an opinion by Justice Brennan, the author of the majority opinion in
New York Times, the Court applied the New York Times "calculated
fendant then made alternative proposals for independent poll watchers in which plaintiffs' pre-
cinct was always listed first. Lastly, the second letter noted, after ending the prior paragraph
with a reference to plaintiffs' precinct, that the "same election officials" would be serving in the
upcoming election. Id. at 71. Plaintiff pleaded "of and concerning," id. at 69-70, and defen-
dant denied such either as to them as individuals or in their official capacities as election offi-
cers, id. at 71. Defendant testified he was not liable because he did not intend to refer to any
specific persons in the county. Id. at 74. The court implicitly rejected this. Of course, intended
reference is not required under the general rules of the common law. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 cmt. b (1977) ("If the communication is reasonably understood by
the person to whom it is made as intended to refer to the plaintiff, it is not decisive that the de-
famer did not intend to refer to him.").
73 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272-73, 289 (offering a summary of testimony).
74 126 S.E.2d 67 (N.C. 1962).
75 27 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1943).
76 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280 n.20. In analyzing the independent appellate review stan-
dard in a subsequent case, the Court cited to the "representative list" in footnote 20 as evidenc-
ing "the common-law heritage" of the New York Times rule. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 & n.18 (1984).
77 Bailey at 838-39.
78 Id. at 839-44.
79 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (applying the New York Times rule to a state's power to impose criminal
sanctions for criticism of public officials). The Court later found a state criminal libel convic-
tion to violate vagueness requirements of due process. See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195,
200-01 (1966).
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falsehood" s° qualified constitutional standard to a criminal defamation
conviction of a parish district attorney for disparaging the entire
eight-person criminal district bench at a press conference' in re-
sponse to criticism issued the day before by one of the judges. An
analysis of the criminal information contained verbatim in the state
supreme court's opinion demonstrates that only one judge was men-
tioned (several times) in Garrison's statement. No member of the
Courts evinced the least difficulty with the "of and concerning" ele-
ment or mentioned the "impersonal criticism of government 8 5 co-
holding of New York Times despite the state high court's express find-
ing that Garrison engaged in "personal attacks upon the integrity and
honesty of [all] eight judges, 8 6 the state attorney general's charac-
terization of the statements as putting "the integrity of the entire judi-
ciary of the State" in controversy,87 and the state court's approval of
several defamed judges' (all but one unnamed in the statement8 8)
hearsay testimony as admissible proof of an "essential ingredient 8 9 of
the charged crime. 8
80 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75-79.
81 Id. at 66 n.2.
82 Id. at 65, 66-67 & n.2. The Court noted Garrison's statement occurred in the context of a
controversy with the judges over disbursements from a fines and fees fund to fund vice investi-
gations. Id.
83 State v. Garrison, 154 So. 2d 400, 403-06, 417, 421-22 (La. 1963) (the references were
otherwise to "the judges"). In the information each of the judges was mentioned by name, with
the statement the judges "'constituted all the entire bench"' of the court. Id. at 403.
84 In a later case, Monitor Patriot Co. v. Ray, 401 U.S. 265, 273 (1971), the Court correctly
characterized Garrison as involving a criminal conviction for disparaging "a group of state court
judges"; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (interpreting Garrison as a
case involving remarks by Garrison "about the judges before whom he regularly appeared").
85 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 100 (1966).
86 Garrison, 154 So. 2d at 418. Clearly, the Court was aware of and did not disagree with the
state courts' interpretation that all the judges were inclusively defamed, as it quoted extensively
during its constitutional malice analysis from the trial court opinion that Garrison could not
have had "an honest belief[] that not one but all eight of these Judges of the Criminal District
Court were guilty." Garrison, 379 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added) (quoting trial court's opinion).
87 Garrison, 154 So. 2d at 406 (emphasis added).
88 Id. at 424-25. This testimony was not introduced on the issue that the particular judges
were singled out from the group. It is clear that the individual judges and the state supreme
court found it sufficient that the entire bench was defamed. As one testifying judge said, "the
bench, criminal bench, seems to be getting the worst of public opinion." Id. at 424. The court
found the judges' testimony admissible on the ground it was necessary to show they were "ex-
posed to hatred, contempt or ridicule." Id. at 425-26.
89 Id. at 425.
90 Since Justice Brennan was the author of both New York Times and Garrison, the only logical
assumption is that he saw no inconsistency between the two-the former involved impersonal
criticism of government under a "captain of the ship" analysis, whereas the latter involved a col-
lective and inclusive small group disparagement under the general doctrine of the common
law.
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In Rosenblatt v. Baer,9' the Court was confronted with respondent's
claim that, six months after his discharge, he was personally defamed
by, though not specifically named in, statements in petitioner's regu-
larly published, but unpaid, newspaper column. As the Court relied
in substantial part on the conclusion that "the column on its face
contains no clearly actionable statement, 9 3 the alleged libel is worth
analyzing in depth. The "relevant part 9 4 was quoted in Justice Bren-
nan's opinion for the Court:
Been doing a little listening and checking at Belknap Recreation
Area and am thunderstruck by what am learning.
This year, a year without snow till very late, a year with actually few
very major changes in procedure; the difference in cash income simply
fantastic, almost unbelievable.
On any sort of comparative basis, the Area this year is doing literally
hundreds of per cent BETTER than last year.
When consider that last year was excellent snow year, that season
started because of more snow, months earlier last year, one can only
ponder following question:
What happened to all the money last year? and every other year? What magic
has Dana Beane [Chairman of the new commission] and rest of commis-
sion, and Mr. Warner [respondent's replacement as Supervisor] wrought
to make such tremendous difference in net cash results?95
Justice Brennan's analysis of the above language is exceptionally
interesting. Examine the italicized matter-inflammatory language
("thunderstruck," "difference in cash income simply fantastic, almost
unbelievable," "literally hundreds of per cent BETTER than last
year," and "magic... wrought to make such tremendous difference
in net cash results"), 96 the comparison between optimal and non-
optimal weather conditions, limited "major changes in procedure"
(impliedly eliminating another explanation), the positive juxtaposi-
tion of results of the Beane/Warner team with the negative results of
"last year" and "every other year"-and Justice Brennan's conclu-
sions. He conceded, as he must, that the above text "could be read
to imply peculation,""8 but also opined they "could also be read, in
context, merely to praise the present administration."" He said "[p] ersons
91 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
92 Id.
95 Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
94 Id. at 78.
95 Id. at 78-79 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 79; see also id. at 98 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]his
Court... found this a permissible reading of the newspaper article.").
Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
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familiar" with the Area controversy "might well read it as compliment-
ing the luck or skill of new management' and noted witnesses for peti-
tioner testified they had so interpreted the column.' Justice Bren-
nan also noted respondent had supplied extrinsic evidence to
support a libelous meaning-that the column "greatly exaggerated
any new improvement under the new regime"'01 and that "a large part
of the community" interpreted the column as "imputing mismanage-
ment and peculation during respondent's [supervisory] tenure.,1
0 2
Justice Brennan's analysis is both skewed'and contrary to the or-
dinary understanding of language. He emphasized that there was
no clearly actonable statement." But that is not the law and never
has been. " The law looks at the context of the whole article or col-
umn.05 Viewed in that fashion, the most, and maybe only, defensible
interpretation is that the prior regime engaged in "peculation," as
Justice Brennan quaintly termed it. 6 justice Brennan's exceptionally
strained interpretation resembles the antiquated, plaintiff unfriendly
innocent construction/in mitiore sensu rule,0 7 which ignores the most
likely or only defensible interpretation if there is any conceivable al-
ternative interpretation, however unreasonable.
0 8
Clearly, the above defamation would have posed ajury question of
libel in most jurisdictions under the majoritarian view of the common
law.'09 Consequently, Justice Brennan's strained interpretation only
100 Id. (emphasis added).
Id. Note that distortions may imply factual underpinnings to what may otherwise be opin-
ion. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990) ("Even if the speaker states
the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if
his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of fact.").
These distortions may be relevant to determinations of fault. See ELDER, supra note 2, § 7:13, at
108-28.
102 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added).
104 Id. (emphasis added). The use of the singular is telling.
104 ELDER, supra note 2, § 1:7, at 25-36; PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 30, at 780-83.
A charge need not be made directly-indeed, the venom and sting of an accusation is
usually more effective when made by insinuations. The floating calumny which each
reader may affix to any and every official act which his aroused suspicion may lay hold of
is capable of inflicting graver injury and injustice than a direct, specific charge, which
may be squarely met and refuted, if untrue.
Palmerlee v. Nottage, 138 N.W. 312, 312 (1912); see also infra notes 242-53 (discussing Saenz v.
Plaj bo').
ELDER, supra note 2, § 1:7, at 25-36; PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 30, at 781-82.
106 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 79.
107 ELDER, supra note 2, § 1:7, at 25-36; PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 30, at 780-81.
108 ELDER, supra note 2, § 1:7, at 25-36; PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 30, at 780-81.
109 ELDER, supra note 2, § 1:7, at 25-36; PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 30, at 780-81; see
also the Supreme Court cases cited supra notes 7, 10. The trial court's instruction on point
clearly reflects the consensus view:
An insinuation of a crime is actionable as a positive assertion if the meaning is reasonably
plain and clear, and the putting of the words in the form of a question does not change
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became one of constitutional significance because he inextricably
linked the issue of defamatory content (i.e., "no clearly actionable
statement". "on its face") ° with the entirely separate plaintiff re-
quirement of reference to the plaintiff. This inextricable linkage is
clear from Justice Brennan's opinion, e.g., where he followed his
"merely to praise the present administration" construction with the
conclusion, "[t]he only persons mentioned by name are officials of
the new regime; no reference is made to respondent, the three
elected commissioners, or anyone else who had a part in the admini-
stration of the Area during respondent's tenure."'
Justice Brennan's ostrich-head-buried-in-the-sand approach also
ignored the significant indicia mentioned on the face of the column that
provided ample bases for a reasonable fact-finder to find reference to
plaintiff. The indicia include the express mention of his former em-
ployment entity ("Belknap Recreation Area" or "Area"), the "this
year" versus "last year"' 2 (and "every other year") dichotomy, the sev-
eral explicit references to differences in income, the express naming
of the new regime (Beane-Warner),1 3 and the positive/negative
comparison between the new and old (but unnamed) Area re-
gimes."4 Justice Brennan also noted elsewhere in his opinion other
factors a reasonable juror would have found relevant and important
in resolving the reference/identifiability issue. For example, peti-
tioner's status as a regular political columnist and "outspoken propo-
nent of the change in operations"' at the Area (which had occurred
the liability of the defendant if the form and sense of the question is defamatory or de-
rogatory.
Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 98 n.* (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
trialjudge's charge to the jury).
Id. at 79.
"' Id.
11 Id. at 77-78. Clearly, if the article had substituted "during the last administration" for "last
year," the imputation of peculation to the former management entity would have been clear. It
is suggested that the difference is de minimus in terms of how it would be interpreted by the
average or any reasonable reader.
" 13 Id. at 78-79.
"14 Id. at 80 n.2.
115 Id. at 78 (noting further his "sharply stated" views and prior disagreements with respon-
dents and the three commissioners' actions). An analysis of the Appendices to the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire brief in Baer v. Rosenblatt discloses the following: Rosenblatt did
twenty-five "Out of My Head" columns featuring the Area, largely critical or questioning in
tone. Four were after the libel in question. Twenty columns were published prior to the libel.
Baer was mentioned twenty times by name. One other lengthy letter from the chair of the
Belknap Ski Advisory Board responded in detail to Rosenblatt, referring to a prior column as
"[h]alf-truths, distortions and downright falsehoods." Brief for Plaintiff at app. at 80-82, Baer v.
Rosenblatt, 203 A.2d 773 (N.H. 1964) (No. 5211). Another lengthy letter by Bobby Baer at-
tempted to respond to Rosenblatt's laundry list of questions to the Area Management (a col-
umn in which plaintiff was named three times in the first two paragraphs). In this letter Bobby
Baer refers to "Manager Baer" once and the "Manager" four times. Id. at 85-87. Rosenblatt's
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by act of the state legislature and resulted in plaintiff's discharge to
give the new regime "a fresh start" 6) would have been highly rele-
vant. Further, a reasonable juror would have found relevant the
Court's conclusion that the Area's management by respondent and
the commissioners had become and "was still a matter of lively public
interest'"'7-extant proposals for further changes were circulating
and "public interest in the way in which the prior administration had done
its task continued [to be] strong.""s
The Court's opinion did not deal directly with this broader "of
and concerning" approach based on an evaluation of the totality of
the circumstances prevailing at the time of publication, the then and
now prevailing view of the common law."9 The Court responded only
to respondent's two proffered theories of reference/"of and concern-
ing"/colloquium. The first theory proposed was that the column
"cast suspicion indiscriminately" on all of the limited number of per-
sons constituting the former management entity,2 0 "whether or not it
[the jury] found that the imputation of misconduct was specifically
made of and concerning him," 2' an avenue available under state law and
explicitly instructed on by the trial judge.22 However, that theory
raised for the Court the issue of whether liability was barred by the
Court's New York Times holding, "that in the absence of sufficient evi-
dence that the attack focused on the plaintiff, an otherwise
next column mentions this letter by author and refers to another by Brenda Baer in the context
of saying they could not be deemed answers to questions posed to "Fritzie Baer and County
Commissioners." Id. at 88.
116 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 78.
17 Id. at 87 n.14.
118 Id. (emphasis added). This analysis occurred in the context of discussing why "public of-
ficial" status, if Baer had such, was not impacted by the fact he was no longer supervisor. Id. at
96. Note also that plaintiff had been in the same supervisory job for almost a decade. Baer v.
Rosenblatt, 203 A.2d 773, 776 (N.H. 1964).
119 For a non-media example involving former government employees, see Davis v. Copelan,
452 S.E.2d 194, 202 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994), where the court upheld a finding of "of and concern-
ing" as to plaintiff-discharged public hospital employees (part of a group of twenty-nine) in a
publication to co-employees, portraying the class as "criminals or suspected criminals." Al-
though plaintiffs were unnamed, the readers knew plaintiffs and the circumstances of their
termination. This sufficed. Id.; see also DeBlasio v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 624 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (upholding a claim by an unnamed, previously terminated physician
where defendant-hospital's press release impugned personnel involved in a specified cancer
treatment). Under the "well settled" rule, it sufficed that persons reading the text understood it
as referring to plaintiff. The court agreed with plaintiff's allegation that he was one of the
"handful" of physicians at the hospital employing this therapy and persons reading the release
would have reasonably construed his termination as linked to overdosing patients with radia-
tion, an imputation libelous per se. Id.
120 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 79-80. Apparently, this management entity was respondent and the
three county commissioners who hired him and to whom respondent was directly accountable.
Id. at 77.
121 Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
122 Id.
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impersonal attack on governmental operations cannot be utilized to
establish a libel of those administering the operations."2
In affirming that the evidence must be read in any such case as
"specifically directed" at the plaintiff to avoid the "libel on govern-
ment" prohibition, 4 the Court strongly intimated, without resolving
the issue, that "an explicit charge that the Commissioners and [re-
spondent] Baer or the entire Area management were corrupt" would
have supported a recovery by any member thereof,2* subject to com-
pliance with the constitutional malice requirement. 1 6  Indeed, the
Court clearly suggested such an explicit statement would pose no con-
stitutional difficulties: The express charge itself might suffice as evi-
dence of specific direction at each small group member. 7  Even
where the imputation and reference were "merely implicit," as in the
case before the Court,2 8 plaintiff could still recover by proffering ex-
trinsic evidence that the defamatory statement referred to him or
her.'29 In such a situation a defamation defendant could not defend a
suit by one such member of "an identifiable iroup engaged in govern-
mental activity that another was also attacked."'
129 Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964)). But compare jus-
tice Harlan's more reasoned interpretation: "I see no reason why that cause of action should
fail if the jury finds that the article was read as accusing the three Commissioners along with
Baer. This is a very different case from New York Times...." Id. at 100 (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). Later he said: "I cannot understand why a
statement which a jury is permitted to read as meaning 'A is a thief' should become absolutely
privileged if it is read as meaning 'A, B, C, and D are thieves.'" Id.
:24 Id. at 81 (majority opinion).
25 Id. The Court later reinforced this point specifically by comparing the instruction at issue
therein to the "explicit charge" scenario: "Here, no explicit charge of peculation was made; no
assault on the previous management appears." Id. at 82. (emphasis added). This analysis directly
parallels the facts in Ponderv. Cobb, 126 S.E.2d 67 (N.C. 1962), discussed in New York Times. See
supra text accompanying notes 68-74; infra text accompanying note 335. Note that the Rosen-
blatt dicta cannot be read as mandating an explicit charge as a precondition to liability. Saenz v.
Playboy Enters., Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1316 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Taken in its proper context, the
Court's language simply does not support the imposition of an 'explicit charge' requirement.").
:26 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 81 n.5.
Id. at 81. Note that no extrinsic evidence was required by the Court in such a scenario. Id.
at 81-82.
128 Id. at 81.
129 Id. On remand the state supreme court referred the case to the trial court on the basis of
both prior evidence-including Baer's responsibilities and duties-and any new evidence on
the "of and concerning" issue. Baer v. Rosenblatt, 237 A.2d 130, 133 (N.H. 1967).
Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 81-82 (emphasis added). The use of the italicized language is in-
teresting. Is such to be equated with the criteria for determining "public official" status dis-
cussed later in its opinion? See infra note 145. Or is it broader, to include public employees,
none of whom qualify as "public officials," for example, a small group of public school teachers?
See infra notes 315, 324-27, 475-80. Where the small group includes both "public officials" and
non-public officials, the "specific reference" standards discussed in Rosenblatt apply to all, as in
the case before it, involving elected commissioners and Baer, who the Court conceded might be
able to bring himself outside the "public official" status. See infra note 145. The Court specifi-
cally cited to and relied on Gilberg v. Goffi, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), where
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The Court distinguished the above scenarios from the case before
it where the jury was allowed to find both its libelous nature and refer-
ence to respondent from the challenged libel itself, even though it
constituted "on its face.., only an impersonal discussion of govern-
mental activity."' The Court opined broadly that the small group
defamation jury instruction was constitutionally defective, because it
allowed liability to be imposed upon a finding Baer was "one of a
small group acting for an organ of government, only some of whom
were implicated, but all of whom were tinged with suspi-
cion... liability merely on the basis of his relationship to the gov-
ernment agency" whose activities were at issue.
132
Despite the Court's grandiloquent language, it is clear the Court
was not invalidating the small group defamation theory in the doubly
implicit setting but only finding defective the particular instruction
amplifying the theory in this setting. This is shown by the Court's
fixation on the jury's "too broad" 33 discretion-to transform an im-
personal critique of government into "of and concerning" Baer-
found in italicized language identified in the trial court "small group"
defamation instruction:
"It is sufficient if Mr. Baer ... proves.. . that he was one of a group upon
whom suspicion was cast... ; but Mr. Baer has the burden of showing that
the court held that plaintiff-partner in the defamed "Mayor's law firm" was required to show
such specific reference. Plaintiff's subjective construction of the words and his receipt of a
number of "unidentified telephone messages" calling his attention to the article did not suffice
under New York Times. Id. Plaintiff also relied on the fact he was the active member of the
firm-which contained only his and the mayor's names-and was in sole charge of cases in the
city court referred to as a "clear conflict of interests" in defendant's defamatory remarks. Id.
He also alleged he was known to the bar, bench and many litigants in this capacity, who identi-
fied him with the remarks. The court's sole response was that plaintiff could not rely thereon
because he had failed to show either actual or constructive notice by defendant that plaintiff
was a member of the "Mayor's law firm." Id. Apparently, had he shown such knowledge, his
claim would have been viable. A dissenter trenchantly refuted the majority's knowledge analy-
sis, pointing out that defendant undoubtedly knew plaintiff was the mayor's partner for two rea-
sons-plaintiff's name was in the firm name and he was specifically mentioned in the newspaper
article which defendant relied on in making his defamatory remarks. Id. at 833 (Beldock, P.J.,
dissenting). Compare Gilberg's implicit conclusion that proof of such knowledge would have
sufficed with the Restatement (Second) of Torts illustration of how a member of a maligned
large group-radio repairmen who solicited telephone calls and responded to contacts there-
from were engaged in a dishonest "racket" to remove radios and not return them-met the "of
and concerning" by showing he was the sole local repairman who solicited business in this
manner by advertising extensively for such calls. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A
(1977). The illustration concludes: "Readers of the newspaper thus reasonably understand
that the article is intended to have personal reference to him." Id. § 564A, illus. 5. Further
compare Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893, 900 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002), where the
court upheld a claim against a candidate for state attorney general by unnamed members of the
opposing candidate's "law firm" composed of four lawyers.
1 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 82.
132 Id. (emphasis added).
133 Id. at 82 n.6.
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the defamation, if you find that there was one, either was directed to him
or could have been as one of a small group. 1 34
The Court responded directly to the possible argument that the
doubly implicit instruction directed the jury to find liability
only if it found that the libel was aimed at Mr. Baer or if it found that the
libel aimed at Mr. Baer, along with a few others. Such a charge might not
be objectionable; we do not mean to suggest that the fact that more than
one person is libeled by a statement is a defense to suit by a member of
the group. However, we cannot read the charge as being so limited.
135
In light of this "might not be objectionable" caveat, the true crux and
narrow holding of the Court's "too broad" jury discretion concern as
to the doubly implicit scenario was the "could have been" alternative to
the "directed to him" burden dictated by the "one or some" aspect.
This defect could have been easily eliminated by deleting the "one or
some" aspect, "either" and "could have been" and rephrasing this
part of the instruction:
13 Id. Although not italicized by the Court as problematic, the Court's holding appears to be
specifically limited to scenarios where the trial court instructs on a situation involving small
group defamation not involving a fully inclusive defamation of the group but defamation of less
than all of the group. Note that the trial court did instruct that "'an imputation of impropriety
or a crime to one or some of a small group that casts suspicion upon all is actionable." Id. (empha-
sis added). In other words, the "one or some of a small group" and "casts suspicion" or "suspi-
cion was cast," are inextricably linked. Id. This reflects the black letter rule found in the Re-
statement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. c (1977) ("Even when the statement
does not purport to include all of the small group or class but only someof them, as in the case
of 'Some of A's children are thieves,' it is still possible for each member of the group to be defamed by
the suspicion attached to him by the accusation." (emphasis added)). In Rosenblatt this "one or some"
language related back to "an imputation of impropriety or a crime." Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 80.
Clearly, respondent wanted to link himself to the implied "peculation." Id. at 82. Baer had two
problems in this respect. One, the implication of wrongdoing was not necessarily fully inclusive.
Peculation could conceivably have occurred without all of the Area's management entity being
involved therein. Second, Baer's alternative non-small group defamation basis for "of and con-
cerning" relied on the argument he was the "man in charge" responsible for financial matters.
Id. at 83. A fully inclusive small group defamation instruction would have been inconsistent
with the latter. See infra text accompanying notes 139-45. Consequently, Baer's options were
maximized and the ambiguity of the implication taken into account by the "could have been"
qualifier that ultimately decimated the instruction. For another interpretation of Rosenblatt as a
.one or some of a small group" case, see Scelfo v. Rutgers University, 282 A.2d 445, 448 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. Law Div. 1971), where the court said Rosenblatt supported this "established point of law."
As a corollary, "an explicit charge directed to... the entire force would allow any member of
the identified group to recover." Id. However, in the case before it, there was no such "sweep-
ing charge" directed at the entire group, i.e., the mounted police assigned to co-defendant uni-
versity. Id. Only two unidentified and unidentifiable officers were shown in a picture attached
to co-defendant author's essay about an SDS-YAF confrontation. Moreover, additional factors
undermined the identification issue. No reference was made to the photo in the article. No
caption pointed out the two police in the photo as the "pigs" mentioned in the article. No
other factors in the picture-such as crowds or other linking campus events--connected the
photo to the confrontation. Id. The "of and concerning" was only one ground of many-the
matter was nonactionable name-calling, the matter was not false, and no constitutional malice
had been alleged or shown. Id. at 449-51.
135 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 82 n.6. (emphasis added).
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"[A] n imputation of impropriety or a crime to all of a small group that
casts suspicion upon all is actionable. It is sufficient if [plain-
tiff] ... proves.., that he was one of a group upon whom suspicion was
cast .... [The plaintiff] [or plaintiffs name] has the burden of showing
that the defamation, if you find that there was one, .. . was directed to
him [or her] ... as one of a small group."'
3 6
These exceedingly modest changes"' would have little or no impact
on actual litigation involving a small group governmental entity in-
clusively defamed. If that is all the Court required, as seems clear,
one is tempted, with Shakespeare, to find such breath-takingly in-
nocuous changes "much ado about nothing."
3 8
The Court also analyzed respondent's second alternative theory of
reference, which it noted was substantiated by several witnesses' trial
testimony,3 9 i.e., the column was interpreted by the jury as "referring
specifically" to him as the individual "in charge" at the Area and "per-
sonally responsible for its financial affairs." 40 Justice Brennan did not
attack this alternative, 4' and could not have, under the "impersonal
criticism of government"4 ' analogy, because it was based on a jury
136 Id. If this defect is eliminated, the implicit assumption is that the Court does not preclude
liability for members of the small group, e.g., the former Area management entity, comprised
of respondent and the three county commissioners. Note that the Area was not a separate legal
entity from the county commission, which employed Baer. See Cox Enters. Inc. v. Carroll
City/County Hosp. Auth., 273 S.E.2d 841, 843 (Ga. 1981) ("The manager was employed by the
county commissioners and the Recreation Area itself was not a separate legal entity.").
1s7 This conclusion is particularly true in light of another part of the trial court instruction,
not quoted by Justice Brennan but quoted by Justice Harlan, where the "could have been" lan-
guage was absent.
'Now, as to any part of the article which you, if you do, find defamatory, and that Mr.
Baer was intended, or he with a few others was intended, he and a small group, if you find that it
was derogatory of him and charged him with a crime, held him up to scorn and ridicule, that
he was the fellow, either singly or in a small group, then you can go on to con-
sider ... whether the publication was privileged orjustified.'
Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 98 n.* (Harlan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting the
trial court's charge to the jury) (emphasis added). As Justice Harlan said, the trial court in-
structions are "conventional tort law" reflecting "an eminently sound" and "salutary" principle,
id. at 98-99, despite Justice Brennan's crankishness and hypertechnical parsing of the instruc-
tion.
138 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING.
139 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 83 (majority opinion).
140 Id. The Court noted in another respect that plaintiff's theory of reference/"of and con-
cerning" might also augur in favor of "public official status" since he contended his position in
the Area's management was "so prominent and important" that the local public treated him as
the individual accountable and, therefore, "chargeable with its failures and to be credited with
its successes." Id. at 87. Also see Justice Black's conclusion supportive of absolute privilege in
which he viewed the case as "discussing the way an agent of government does his governmental
job." Id. at 94 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). Note Justice Brennan seemed to be un-
aware of the anomalies he created. Baer was arguably prominent enough that this worked
against him on the status issue while such prominence was irrelevant as to his identification/"of
and concerning" as a member of the maligned Area management!
141 Id. at 83-88 (majority opinion).
142 Id. at 100 (HarlanJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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conclusion Baer was the individual personally responsible for the
"peculation."4 3 The Court's sole ground for constitutional inade-
quacy was the impropriety of the jury instruction on constitutional
malice1" if respondent was in fact a "public official" under the Court'sS 141
newly announced standards.
The Court's exceedingly narrow holding in Rosenblatt was exem-
plified two years later in its interpretation and application of New York
Times in Pickering v. Board of Education, 46 in the context of employer
discharge of a teacher who wrote a letter to the editor critical of the
city board of education. Although its members were not specifically
named, the board charged that both it as an entity and its individual
members' reputations were disparagedt.' The Court found the
teacher to be functioning as a prototypical public citizen and con-
cluded that he could not be sanctioned without a showing of knowing
or reckless disregard of falsity under New York Times, noting that nei-
ther the board of education nor the individual member(s) thereof
could have sued for libel except upon such proof.4 . Interestingly, no
1 Id. at 82 (majority opinion).
144 Id. at 83-84.
145 The Court took up the issue left unresolved by New York Times and provided two general
tests for "public official" status. See supra note 28. The status "applies at the very least to those
among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, sub-
stantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Rosenblatt, 383
U.S. at 85. It also applied to "position[s] in government [of] such apparent importance that
the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person
who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all
government employees ... ." Id. at 86. To the suggestion that this might extend to the night
watchman, see id. at 88-89 (Douglas, J., concurring), the Court appended an important caveat:
New York Times did not apply merely "because a statement defamatory of some person in gov-
ernment employ catches the public's interest; that conclusion would virtually disregard society's
interest in protecting reputation." Id. at 86 n.13. Accordingly, the governmental employee's
position "must be one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding
it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy."
Id. (emphasis added). On the impact of the mere governmental employee versus "public offi-
cial" dichotomy on the small group defamation rule, see the discussion infra text accompanying
notes 475-80. For general discussions, see ELDER, supra note 2, § 5:1, at 3-33; Elder, supra note
24. The Court noted the possibility that Baer could bring himself outside the "public official"
realm. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 87. Justice Douglas said respondent might have been "a hybrid in
the nature of independent contractor." Id. at 91 n.5 (Douglas, J., concurring). On remand, the
court imposed the burden of showing "public official" status on defendant and concluded it was
not enough that he showed Baer had general responsibility for financial matters at the Area and
general powers of supervision under the commissioners' control. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 237 A.2d
130, 132-33 (N.H. 1967).
146 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
147 Id. at 567, 570-74.
148 Id. at 573-74.
It is... perfectly clear that, were [Pickering] a member of the general public, the State's
power to afford the ... Board of Education or its members any legal right to sue him for
writing the letter at issue here would be limited by the requirement that the letter be
judged by the standard laid down in New York Times.
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member of the Court treated the board as a City of Chicago equivalent
and no member of the Court treated individual members thereof as
subject to any First Amendment-mandated small group defamation
"of and concerning" restrictions.1 49
Three years later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,"o the Court ma-
jority fleetingly adopted the New York Times constitutional malice
standard in a private person matter of general or public interest case
involving two sets of telecasts, one about the original arrest wherein
plaintiff was named... and a second series of thirteen broadcasts over
a twelve-day period, 15' none of which expressly identified the plaintiff
by name. 5 The Court's plurality opinion by Justice Brennan specifi-
cally synthesized (and tacitly affirmed the propriety of) the trial
court's instruction-that "a reasonable listener would conclude that
the defamatory statement referred to petitioner."'54  Despite defen-
dant's contention that plaintiff had offered no witness testimony as to
the second series, the trial court left the issue to the jury to resolve
under the common law "reasonable listener" totality of the "sur-
rounding circumstances" standard.' Under the latter plaintiff was
identifiable as the sole Philadelphia distributor of nudist periodicals
then seeking injunctive relief in federal courts against raids by law en-
forcement authorities.
5 6
Similarly, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,57 the Court referenced a tele-
vision appearance by Proxmire, the defendant senator, among the al-
leged libels and noted that he had described plaintiffs research but
Id. at 573 (emphasis added). Analogizing to the district attorney-judge setting in Garrison, see
supra notes 79-90, the Court held that First Amendment protection must be accorded this
speech "despite the fact that the statements are directed at their nominal superiors." Pickering, 391
U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).
149 Id. at 575-82 (Douglas, J., with Black, J., concurring); id. at 582-84 (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). For a parallel dissent in the Illinois Supreme Court, see
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1, 7-10 (Ill. 1967) (Schaeffer, J., with Solfisburg, C.J., dis-
senting).
150 403 U.S. 29, 45-57 (1971) (plurality opinion). The Court repudiated the New York Times
standard in favor of a negligence standard in private person-public interest cases in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-50 (1974).
151 Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 33.
1 Id. at 34.
'53 Id. The Court quoted a "pretty much" typical example, citing arguments from one dis-
tributor and two publishers seeking (but not getting) injunctive relief from the district attorney,
police commissioner and local newspaper. Id.
154 Id. at 39.
155 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 737, 744 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ("The law is clear
that '[t] he fact that the plaintiff is not specifically named in the [publication] is not controlling.
A party defamed need not be specifically named, if pointed to by description or circumstances tending
to identify him. .. .'" (quoting Cosgrove Studio & Camera Shop, Inc. v. Pane, 182 A.2d 751, 753
(Pa. 1962)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added)).
156 Id.
157 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
May 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
not named him.'58 Resolving issues of status'59 and Speech and De-
bate Clause 60 protection favorably to the plaintiff, Hutchinson, the
Court reversed and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit. Again,
as in Rosenbloom, no member of the Court discussed the possibility of
any constitutional restrictions on the "of and concerning" issue on
remand. The appellate court had not definitively resolved the latter
local law issue, reaching only the controlling First Amendment is-
sue.16 ' The appellate court took no position on the district court's
conclusion that neither the "brief and innocuous" television refer-
ence nor the newsletter statements sufficed for the certainty required
for "of and concerning" under state law.
62
Shortly thereafter, the Court raised doubts about New York Times'
"impersonal criticism of government" aspect, at least as to its possible
application in the malicious prosecution context,63 by remanding City
of Long Beach v. Bozek 6" to the California Supreme Court for
158 Id. at 117 n.4 (noting parties' stipulation that defendant referred to plaintiffs research on
at least one television show). The Court also mentioned a 1976 newsletter in which the
"Golden Fleece" awards to governmental entities providing wasteful grants were listed with ref-
erence to specific projects, but plaintiff was not named. The newsletter referred to plaintiff's
purported "why the monkeys clench their jaw" research as "monkey business" which had been
dropped by the relevant government agencies. Id. at 117.
1 Id. at 133-36; see also text accompanying infra note 416 (discussing public figure status).
160 Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 123-33 (finding press releases and newsletters were outside the
absolute immunity provided by the Speech and Debate Clause).
161 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e agree with the dis-
trict court that summary judgment was proper based upon first amendment grounds. Conse-
quently, we need not decide whether the statements were actionable defamation under local
law.").
162 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1331-33 (W.D. Wis. 1977) ("It is also clear
that in the District of Columbia the brief and innocuous statement Senator Proxmire made on
the Mike Douglas Show did not constitute defamation, nor did any of the other statements
about which Dr. Hutchinson complains.").
163 For a brief discussion of the malicious prosecution cases, see infra note 189.
164 645 P.2d 137, 140-43 (Cal. 1982). The court found an absolute privilege for a defendant
who had previously unsuccessfully sued the city for tortious police misconduct. The court com-
bined the right of petition, which historically barred this "sharp tool for retaliation," and tort
doctrine to support the absolute privilege, finding that the state's interests in deterring frivolous
litigation were met by statutory allowance of attorney fees in the first proceeding, criminal liabil-
ity for false claims, and the specter of malicious prosecution suits by individuals, such as the po-
lice officers in question. Id. Justice Kaus in dissent found the majority's theory "startling" and
"riddled with fundamental and fatal flaws." Id. at 143-44 (Kaus, J., dissenting). First, the peti-
tion clause cases also involved the right to sue another private party, which would (under the
majority's logic) bar all malicious prosecution actions, not only those by governmental struc-
tures. Second, no precedent supported the majority's analysis which would also bar criminal
liability for fraudulent claims made against governmental officials. Third, American precedent
gave the courts the authority to recover attorneys fees for frivolous litigation-but the majority's
logic would bar awarding of such specific or even ordinary costs against a party unsuccessfully
suing a governmental entity. Fourth, the majority's reliance on the California statute authoriz-
ing attorney fees "in effect acknowledges the weakness of its own logic"-the majority's logic
would invalidate such a statute, but the majority "inexplicably embraces" it. Id. at 143-46 (Kaus,
J., dissenting). Note that Bozek did not bar a city and baseball team owner from bringing a de-
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determination whether its judgment was "based upon federal or state
constitutional grounds, or both.' 6  In this case the California Su-
preme Court had held that a malicious prosecution proceeding
brought by a municipality victor in false arrest litigation for reim-
bursement of litigation expenses was barred, in part, by the absolute
privilege afforded to criticism of government under New York Times
and its progeny.166 On remand, the California Supreme Court found
that the petition clause of the California Constitution was an inde-
pendent basis for its earlier decision,' thereby depriving the U.S. Su-
preme Court of a basis for further review.'
The Court returned to the Petition Clause issue in 1985 in
McDonald v. Smith,6 9 the last of its major cases analyzing the quali-
fied/absolute immunity dichotomy in First Amendment libel cases.
This case involved a letter to President Reagan opposing plaintiff's
nomination as U.S. Attorney. In a powerful opinion the Court
unanimously7° rejected preferred status for the Petition Clause, find-
ing that it was "cut from the same cloth"' as other clauses in the First
Amendment. The Court exclusively relied on its analysis of the
common law qualified public interest privilege in a parallel appeal to
the President 140 years earlier as conclusive of the Framer's intent."'
Following the reasoning of Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court expressly
rejected absolute privilege 173 (as did Justice Brennan's equally strong
concurrence174), finding "[t]he right to petition is guaranteed; the
claratoryjudgment action against initiative proponents even though they were private parties.
City of San Diego v. Dunk], 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) ("Nothing in Bozek
prevents a public or private entity from seeking, in an otherwise authorized action, a judicial
declaration of the invalidity of a proposed ballot measure, even where private citizens are the
proponents of same.").
City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 459 U.S. 1095 (1983).
166 City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 645 P.2d at 143 ("[T]he bringing of suits against the gov-
ernment is absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis for imposition of civil liability for
malicious prosecution.").
167 City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 661 P.2d 1072, 1073 (Cal. 1983).
1 Id.; see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 10-12 n.5 (1990) (noting that the
Ohio Supreme Court could address the issue of greater state constitutional protection for opin-
ion on remand). A few states have done so, including Ohio. See ELDER, supra note 2, § 8:23, at
66-70.
1W 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (holding that the Petition Clause does not provide government offi-
cials absolute immunity from libel charges).
170 The participating Justices were unanimous. Justice Powell did not participate. Id. at 480.
171 Id. at 482.
172 Id. at 484 ("Nothing presented to us suggests that the Court's decision not to recognize an
absolute privilege in 1845 should be altered." (construing White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. 266
(1845))).
173 Id. (citing Garrison for the proposition that petitions to the President are not protected
from libel claims).
174 Id. at 486-87 (Brennan,J., concurring) (quoting at length from Garrison). "[E]xpression
falling within the scope of the Petition Clause, while fully protected by the actual-malice stan-
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right to commit libel with impunity is not."7 5 The Court affirmed
both lower courts, noting the reasoning of the district court, 76 which
had expressly based its qualified constitutional privilege conclusion
on New York Times' reliance on Ponder v. Cobb's'7 petition clause/small
group defamation setting reasoning.
In sum, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, common law and
constitutional, generally reflects the views of the common law and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts 78  on the "of and concern-
ing"/reference/colloquium issue. Plaintiff can meet the latter by
showing plaintiff's picture was used,79 office was identified,'8 or that
the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the reader or
viewer support such a finding.'8' The small group libel doctrine, 2 at
least as to fully inclusive groups of eight individuals or fewer (the Gar-
rison scenario ), also seems to be available to plaintiff. The tepid
Rosenblatt incursion thereon appears narrowly limited to libel not
clearly libelous on its face and where the jury instruction contains the
amorphous "could have been" language in its instruction. The
Court's constitutional jurisprudence evidences strong preference for
the "calculated falsehood" standard established by New York Times and
Garrison.'8 5 Lastly, it is not ineluctably clear that the Court's City of
Chicago interpretation portends absolute protection or whether the
Court would affirm it as such or extend the reasoning to the mali-
cious prosecution setting. 11
dard set forth in New Yor* Times Co. v. Sullivan, is not shielded by an absolute privilege." Id. at
490.
175 Id. at 485 (majority opinion).
176 Smith v. McDonald, 562 F. Supp. 829, 841 (M.D.N.C. 1983) (noting that "when the Su-
preme Court fashioned the requirements that plaintiffs must meet to recover in libel actions
involving issues of free speech, it looked for guidance to [Ponder v. Cobb]"), aff'd, 737 F.2d 427,
428-30 (4th Cir. 1984), affid, 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
177 See supra notes 67-72.
78 See infra text accompanying notes 273, 274, 300, 307-08, 317, 320, 322, 328, 369.
1 79 See supra text accompanying note 12.
180 See Henry v. Pearson, 158 So. 2d 695, 699 (Miss. 1963), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965) (explaining that two of the three libels identified
plaintiffs by name, the third referred to them by position, e.g., county attorney of a specific
county and chief of police of "my town"); see also supra text accompanying note 13.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 38-53.
182 See infra text accompanying notes 283-330.
185 See supra notes 66-73, 79-90.
184 See supra notes 120-38.
1 85 See supra notes 16-29, 79-90, 144-45, 148-56, 169-77.
18 See supra notes 147-49, 163-68.
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II. THE SEDITIOUS LIBEL ANALOGY AND SUITS BY GOVERNMENT AND
GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS-LOWER COURT PRECEDENT
Despite clear intimations in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence1. 187
that the issue is not unambiguous, and the caveat as to municipal
corporations by the Restatement (Second) of Torts,... the established
consensus 89 of the somewhat limited precedent at lower levels views
187 See supra text accompanying notes 35, 146-49.
I See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 561 caveat 2 (1977). The Restatement expressed
no opinion on "whether there may be liability for defamation of a municipal corporation and if
so under what circumstances." In the comment on the caveat the drafters noted that the lim-
ited precedent accorded absolute immunity to defamers and concluded that "[n]o doubt" the
rule therein was linked to the large group defamation precedent. Id. cmt. d. However, in the
limited precedent the matter in question was privileged and might not be determinative for the
future. Id. One decision rejected the analogy to private, not-for-profit corporations on the ba-
sis of the city's funding base, the power of taxation. Johnson City v. Cowles Communications,
Inc., 477 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tenn. 1972) (holding that criticisms of government are absolutely
privileged).
189 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 919 F. Supp. 756, 759
(D.N.J. 1996) (noting that cases have "consistently reaffirmed" the view that government enti-
ties cannot maintain an action for libel); Edgartown Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Johnson, 522 F.
Supp. 1149 (D. Mass. 1981); Cox Enters. v. Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth., 273 S.E.2d 841
(Ga. 1981); Weymouth Township Bd. of Educ. v. Wolf, 429 A.2d 431 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1981). Several alternatively concluded that such an entity has no protectable reputation under
state law or the common law. See City of Philadelphia v. Washington Post Co., 482 F. Supp. 897,
898-99 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (dismissing defamation claims brought by city over a newspaper story
chronicling a history of alleged police brutality on grounds that a governmental entity is inca-
pable of being libeled); State v. Time, Inc., 249 So. 2d 328 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that a
state is not a person for purposes of defamation or libel), cert. denied, 252 So. 2d 456 (La. 1971);
Vill. of Grafton v. Am. Broad. Co., 435 N.E.2d 1131 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (holding that munici-
pal corporations are not persons that have standing to sue for defamation); Johnson City, 477
S.W.2d at 752-54 (Tenn. 1972) (holding that a municipal corporation is not a person for pur-
poses of libel).
Two decisions extended the no-libel-of-government rule to governmental entities suing in
malicious prosecution. See City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 645 P.2d 137, 140-43 (Cal. 1982), cert.
granted, vacated, 459 U.S. 1095 (1983), on remand, 661 P.2d 1072 (1983) (reiterating prior opin-
ion); Bd. of Educ. v. Marting, 217 N.E.2d 712, 717 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1966) (noting that mali-
cious prosecution, like defamation, was an action for injury to reputation). A third relied on
historical precedent from Britain denying malicious prosecution in such cases because of the
right to petition and denied a claim on common law grounds. It cited Bozek and Marting. Cate
v. Oldham, 450 So. 2d 224, 225-27 (Fla. 1984). The certifying court was receptive to the Bozek
absolutist position. Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1185-90 (lth Cir. 1983). Note that
McDonald v. Smith rejected an absolute privilege in Petition Clause cases under the First
Amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 169-77. Another decision did not reach the
Bozek issue, finding the case deficient for failure to show lack of probable cause. City of New
Haven v. Reichhart, 748 N.E.2d 374 (Ind. 2001). Cf Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Finlan, 27
S.W.3d 220 (Tex. App. 2000), where the court upheld a claim for civil conspiracy to defraud
plaintiff school district, finding the elements of civil conspiracy different from malicious prose-
cution. This case was later distinguished from a defamation claim under the New York Times-City
of Chicago rule. See Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Klein & Assocs. Political Relations, 70 S.W.3d
349, 352-53 (Tex. App. 2002).
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the right of both media and non-media critics9 ' to criticize govern-
ment and large governmental entities as "now an indisputable
axiom"'9' of freedoms of expression found in the state92 and federal
constitutions.9 3 The decisions universally rely on the notion of popu-
lar sovereignty94 as "an American birthright 9 5 and the "bedrock of
190 The cases uniformly accord general approval to protection of both media and private crit-
ics. See Cox Enters., 273 S.E.2d at 842; City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 90-91 (Ill.
1923); State v. Time, Inc., 249 So. 2d 328, 331-32 (La. Ct. App. 1971);Johnson City, 477 S.W.2d
at 753-54. Several have actually involved non-media defendants. See Coll. Sav. Bank, 919 F.
Supp. at 757-66 (extending protection to a business competitor in a prepaid college tuition
program); Johnson, 522 F. Supp. at 1150-53 (involving resident's letters to newspaper and Board
of Selectmen); City of Albany v. Meyer, 279 P. 213, 214-15 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929) (involving
an action against the author of an article describing the city as bankrupt); Aluminum Co. of
Am. v. City of Lafayette, 412 N.E.2d 312, 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (addressing corporate chal-
lenge to city's compliance with annexation responsibilities); Wolf 429 A.2d at 432-33 (involving
a taxpayer association and its members); Capital Dist. Reg'l Off Track Betting Corp. v. N.E.
Harness Horsemen's Ass'n, 399 N.Y.S.2d 597, 598-99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (involving a newslet-
ter of a non-profit corporation alleging various legal and financial improprieties); Port Arthur
Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 S.W.3d at 351 & n.1 (providing protection to the owner of a website, called
the South East Texas Political Review, and refusing to draw any distinction between the website
and owner).
One case applying the non-standing rule involved a sports franchise leaving the city and
purportedly hurting the city's sports image. HMC Mgmt. v. New Orleans Basketball Club, 375
So. 2d 700, 710 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
191 Cox Enters., 273 S.E.2d at 843 (quoting LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 12-10, 12-11 (Ist ed. 1978)); see also SMOLLA, supra note 15, § 4:76, 4-122.2 ("[G]overmental
corporations are not like other corporations for First Amendment purposes, precisely because
they are the government"); id. at 4-124 ("[T]he only position consistent with the common law
traditions and constitutional principles is that all governmental and quasi-governmental entities
are flatly barred from maintaining an action for defamation").
192 Meyer, 279 P. at 214-15 (finding that the "abuse" limitation on free speech was no bar to
the privilege); City of Chicago, 139 N.E. at 87-91 (same); Wolf, 429 A.2d at 433 (noting that the
state constitution "abuse" limitation on free speech did not "militate against" absolute First
Amendment privilege); Capital Dist. Reg'l Off Track Betting Corp., 399 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (dicta). Of
course, City of Chicago predates the Court's recognition of the First Amendment as applicable to
the states. SeeJ. NOWAK & R. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 429, 431 (6th ed. 2000) (noting
that one of the Court's first statements assuming incorporation of the First Amendment was
Gitlow v. NewYork, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)).
193 Coll. Sav. Bank, 919 F. Supp. at 759-66 (applying the same standards to libel and product
disparagement or trade libel); Johnson, 522 F. Supp. at 1151-53; Cox Enters., 273 S.E.2d at 842,
843, 846-47; Aluminum Co. of Am., 412 N.E.2d at 314; Time, Inc., 249 So. 2d at 330-31; Wolf, 429
A.2d at 432-33; Capital Dist. Reg'l Off Track Betting Corp., 399 N.Y.S.2d at 598-99; Am. Broad. Co.,
435 N.E.2d at 1133-36;Johnson City, 477 S.W.2d at 754; Port Arthur School Dist., 70 S.W.3d at 351-
53. The modern cases all start with New York Times' reliance on City of Chicago in its "impersonal
criticism of government analysis" of Sullivan's "of and concerning" difficulties. See supra text
accompanying notes 32-34.
194 Washington Post, 482 F. Supp. at 798-99; Meyer, 279 P. at 215; City of Chicago, 139 N.E. at
88-91; Town of Golden Meadow v. Comet-Press Newspaper, 532 So. 2d 528, 529 (La. Ct. App.
1988); HMC Mgmt., 375 So. 2d at 710; Time, Inc., 249 So. 2d at 329-33; Wolf 429 A.2d at 432;
Am. Broad. Co., 435 N.E.2d at 1133-36;Johnson City, 477 S.W.2d at 753-54.
195 Time, Inc., 249 So. 2d at 331.
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democracy,"'' 96 and reject standing' of government or governmental
entities to sue as "out of tune with the American spirit, and [having]
no place in American jurisprudence."'98
Under this absolute privilege-with its disallowance of liability for
knowing or reckless falsity 99 and inquiry into good faith°20°-inequities
may periodically seem to arise.20' However, as one court opined, "if
unfairness there must be, we deem it preferable that it should be on
the side of freedom of speech. 2 2 Another concluded, "if critics of
government, be they citizens or press, speak only at the risk of being
prosecuted for libel or slander, few will criticize government at all.
2
Accordingly, absent the "powerlessness of government"2 4 to sue, every
critic faced with difficult to prove charges °  would be silenced by the
specter of threatened litigation.20 6  Nothing could be "more
196 HMCMgmt., 375 So. 2d at 710; see also Meyer, 279 P. at 215 ("[I]f the administrative officers
of any branch of the government may use the process in libel, either civil or criminal, to control
criticism of their financial policies in the management of the government's business, then the
constitutional guaranty of free speech becomes a shadow without a substance.").
197 A civil action was "as great, if not a greater, restriction" on free speech because it elimi-
nated the restrictions imposed by the law on criminal prosecutions, including, for example,
damages greater than the criminal penalty, lack of a proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard
and lack of a presumption of innocence. City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 90 (Ill.
1923); see also Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534, 548 (H.L.
1993) (quoting City of Chicago). This analysis was likewise adopted by the Court in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan as to libels by individuals. 376 U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964).
198 City of Chicago, 139 N.E. at 91; see also Meyer, 279 P. at 215; Time, Inc., 249 So. 2d at 330; Am.
Broad. Co., 435 N.E.2d at 1134;Johnson City, 477 S.W.2d at 753-54.
199 Washington Post, 482 F. Supp. at 898; Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 919 F. Supp. 756, 759-66 (D.N.J. 1996); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. City of Lafayette,
412 N.E.2d 312, 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Time, Inc., 249 So. 2d at 330-31; Wolf, 429 A.2d at
432-33. Even the early case of City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., where the plaintiff alleged falsity
and malice, was resolved on absolute privilege grounds based on "public policy and fundamen-
tal principles of government," the court refusing to considering the truth-falsity issues. City of
Chicago, 139 N.E. at 91.
200 Wolf 429 A.2d at 432-33.
201 Am. Broad. Co., 435 N.E.2d at 1136.
202 Id.; see also Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 219 F. Supp. 156, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (postu-
lating "a firm policy permitting the widest latitude in criticism of a governmental entity").
Cox Enters. v. Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth., 273 S.E.2d 841, 842 (Ga. 1981). This
right to criticize is not limited to those within the geographic locus of the entity being criticized.
Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Klein & Assocs. Political Relations, 70 S.W.3d 349, 352-53 (Tex.
APA 2002).
Cox Enters., 273 S.E.2d at 846.
20'9 City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 89 (I1. 1923); Am. Broad. Co., 435 N.E.2d at
1135; Johnson City v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 477 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tenn. 1972); see also
Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534, 548 (H.L. 1993) ("Quite
often the facts which would justify a defamatory publication are known to be true, but admissi-
ble evidence capable of proving those facts is not available.").
206 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 919 F. Supp. 756, 760
(D.NJ. 1996) (holding that the no-libel-of-government doctrine "simply does not tolerate re-
taliatory efforts by government," criminal or civil, "to stifle open debate about its actions, re-
gardless of the speaker's intent"); City of Chicago, 139 N.E. at 90-91; Am. Broad. Co., 435 N.E.2d
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destructive" of democracy than empowering "a corrupt government
to stifle all opposition by free use of the public treasury to silence crit-
iCS,,207ics.
' ' °
All manner of governmental entities-an agency of the federal
government,208 the state20 9 or a state entity,2 10 municipal corporationsr 1 • 211 2 1.2 1
of all sizes, local boards,12  governmental subdivisions, quasi-
governmental entities with specialized functions 14-are covered by
this prohibition. Moreover, the prohibition applies to all types of
criticism of government,2 5 even as to a government entity acting in a
at 1135; Derbyshire County Council, [1993] A.C. at 548 ("The threat of a civil action for defama-
tion must inevitably have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech").
207 Johnson City, 477 S.W.2d at 754. See City of Chicago, 139 N.E. at 91; Am. Broad. Co., 435
N.E.2d at 1135; see also Coll. Sav. Bank, 919 F.Supp. at 760 (suggesting that any other approach
would allow government to "employ its potentially vast resources to chill speech in any number
of contexts"); Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 S.W.3d at 352 ("If the government is permitted to
use public resources to bring defamation claims against its critics, criticism of government will
be silenced through, at the very least, fear of monetary loss.").
208 Saenz v. Morris, 746 P.2d 159, 162-63 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the "of and
concerning" element was not met where plaintiff was portrayed merely as an employee of the
implicated government entity because the class of persons was so large that it constituted im-
personal criticism of government). Although the class in this case is somewhat ambiguous, it
seems to include all Office of Public Safety officials. See infra discussion in the text supported by
notes 270-81. Compare infra discussion of the other Saenz litigation accompanying notes 242-
53.
State v. Time, Inc., 249 So. 2d 328, 329-34 (La. Ct. App. 1971). Cf S.C. State Ports Auth.
v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 346, 348-51 (D.D.C. 1987) (allowing a negligence
claim to proceed against a consultant that prepared a comparison report of two state ports for
use by one of them as a marketing tool). In South Carolina State Ports Authority, the court found
this was not an "end-run around the libel laws," but a negligence-based duty to a third party
based on objective data and limited to economic injury. This form of commercial speech
should "prove quite hardy" against threats of negligence liability and meet First Amendment
concerns. Id.
21 Coll. Sav. Bank, 919 F. Supp. at 757-66 (involving a state agency operating a tuition pre-
payment program).
11 City of Philadelphia v. Washington Post Co., 482 F. Supp. 897, 898-99 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
City of Albany v. Meyer, 279 P. 213, 214-15 (Cal. Ct. Dist. App. 1929); Town of Golden Meadow
v. Comet Press Newspaper, Inc., 532 So. 2d 528, 529-30 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Aluminum Co. of
Am. v. City of Lafayette, 412 N.E.2d 312, 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); HMC Mgmt. v. New Orleans
Basketball Club, 375 So. 2d 700, 710 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Am. Broad. Co., 435 N.E.2d at 1132-36;
Johnson City, 477 S.W.2d at 752-54.
212 Weymouth Township Bd. of Educ. v. Wolf, 429 A.2d 431, 432-33 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1981).
213 Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 219 F. Supp. 156, 162-63 (N.D. I11. 1963); Stow v. Coville,
644 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Klein Assocs. Politi-
cal Relations, 70 S.W.3d 349, 351-53 (Tex. App. 2002).
214 Cox Enters. v. Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth., 273 S.E.2d 841, 843-47 (Ga. 1981); Capi-
tal Dist. Reg'l Off Track Betting Corp. v. N.E. Harness Horsemen's Ass'n, 399 N.Y.S.2d 597,
598-99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (involving a public corporation to operate off-track horse-racing
system).
215 Coll. Say. Bank, 919 F. Supp. 756, 760-66 (D.N.J. 1996) (involving criticism of misrepre-
sentation by a state tuition prepayment program); Edgartown Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. John-
son, 522 F. Supp. 1149, 1151-53 (D. Mass. 1981) (concerning a public allegation of police cor-
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proprietary capacity2 16 and even where its critic is a competitor.2"7  It
has been suggested that such absolute immunity is even more com-
pelling in cases of the government acting proprietarily because of the
enhanced opportunities for corruption, incompetence and effi-
ciency,218 and the concomitant augmented inducement to silence crit-
iCS219ics.2
220fIn sum, government, whether suing in its own name, on behalf• • -- 1 • 221-
of its citizens under parens patriae, on behalf of a maligned sub-
ruption); Washington Post, 482 F. Supp. at 898-99 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (dismissing claims over a
newspaper story chronicling a history of alleged police brutality); Progress Dev. Corp., 219 F.
Supp. at 158, 163 (alleging violations of civil rights); Meyer, 279 P. at 214-15 (Cal. Ct. App.
1929) (involving an article describing the city as bankrupt), Cox Enters., 273 S.E.2d at 843-47
(involving mismanagement of a hospital with patient care complications and economic dis-
tress); City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 909-91 (Ill. 1923) (involving statements al-
leged to have intended to destroy the city's credit standing); Comet Press Newspaper, Inc., 532 So.
2d at 529 (involving statements over flooding due to a hurricane); HMC Mgmt., 375 So. 2d at
710 (involving the validity of a lease agreement for playing professional basketball games in the
Superdome); Wolf 429 A.2d at 431 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981) (listing allegations of misuse,
loss, or possible embezzlement of school funds by a school board); Capital Dist. Reg'l Off Track
Betting Corp., 399 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (involving violations of law in operating pari-mutuel betting
system); Stow, 644 N.E.2d at 676 (imputing tax unfairness); Aluminum Co. of Am., 412 N.E.2d at
314 (imputing non-compliance with annexation duties); Am. Broad. Co., 435 N.E.2d at 1133,
1136-37 (involving allegations of inviting or permitting pollution, resulting in an "unwhole-
some environment"); Johnson City, 477 S.W.2d at 751-54 (citing criticisms to the effect that a
municipality is backward, totalitarian, "represents everything terrible," lawless, and a place
where businesses should not locate as falling within the privilege); Port ArthurIndep. Sch. Dist., 70
S.W.3d at 351-53 (involving a "huge fight" at a prom sponsored by a school district).
Dean Prosser has been traditionally critical of City of Chicago. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 30, § 111, at 780 (1984) ("[T]he decisions have turned upon the particular facts and ques-
tions of privilege, and have been criticized"). One noted commentator criticizes this as "one of
the few statements (such as it is) in that text that appears clearly unsound." See SMOLLA, supra
note 15 § 4:76, 4-122.2 n.16; see also Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 S.W.3d at 351-53 (Burgess, J.,
concurring) (concurring in the result only, he would have saved the broader issue of whether
there might exist a case for proper use of a defamation claim by a governmental entity, "particu-
larly" one "solely performing a proprietary function"); cf DOBBS, supra note 58, at 1139 (noting
that, "[i]t may be arguable that a false publication of fact harmful financially to a governmental
entity should be actionable, if not as defamation then as injurious falsehood," but further not-
ing that City of Chicago rejected this idea).
216 Coll. Sav. Bank, 919 F. Supp. at 760-66; Progress Dev. Corp., 219 F. Supp. at 163; Cox Enters.,
273 S.E.2d at 843-47; City of Chicago, 139 N.E. at 90-91; Capital Dist. Reg'l Off Track Betting Corp.,
399 N.Y.S.2d at 598-99; Am. Broad. Co., 435 N.E.2d at 1134-36.
217 Coll. Say. Bank, 919 F. Supp. at 760-66; Progress Dev. Corp., 219 F. Supp. at 163; Capital Dist.
Reg'l Off Track Betting Corp., 399 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
21 Progress Dev. Corp., 219 F. Supp. at 163; Cox Enters., 273 S.E.2d at 846; City of Chicago, 139
N.E. at 91; Am. Broad. Co., 435 N.E.2d at 1134.
219 Progress Dev. Corp., 219 F. Supp. at 163; City of Chicago, 139 N.E. at 91; Am. Broad. Co., 435
N.E.2d at 1134.
22 Washington Post, 482 F. Supp. at 898-99 (holding that the city cannot maintain an action
for libel on its own behalf); State v. Time, Inc., 249 So. 2d 328, 329 (La. Ct. App. 1971) ("[T]he
Court cannot accord with plaintiff's conclusion that the state is a person for purposes of the law
of defamation and libel."); Wolf 429 A.2d at 433 ("[G] ovemental entities, such as plaintiff here,
should not have the right to maintain actions for defamation in their own right.").
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entity therein, or in the interest of protecting individual members
of a disparaged group,223 has no standing to sue for libel in the
United States (or Great Britain2 24). The Supreme Court's repeated
refusal to protect "calculated falsehood"2 25 has not effected the fun-
damental principle26 that a government has no claim for libel.22 v In-
deed, courts will scrutinize claims carefully to make sure that a lawsuit
is not subterfuge for a governmental entity suit.2 Thus, a suit by the
chief of police and a police officers' association was rejected where
the real party in interest was the city police department.)29 The court
2 Washington Post, 482 F. Supp. at 899 (finding Philadelphia's patens patriae theory
unpersuasive in libel suit brought on its own behalf and on behalf of the citizens of the city);
Time, 249 So. 2d at 329, 333-34) (citing in part the large group non-liability rule).
rn Washington Post, 482 F. Supp. at 898-99 (rejecting Philadelphia's claim on behalf of the
Police Department).
223 Id.
2 In Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534, 539-40 (H.L. 1993),
the House of Lords cited to New York Times and City of Chicago and concluded that a local au-
thority had no standing to sue for libel under the common law, noting "it is of the highest pub-
lic importance that a democratically elected governmental body, or indeed any governmental
body, should be open to uninhibited public criticism. The threat of a civil action for defama-
tion must inevitably have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech." Id. at 547. The House of
Lords noted that if local authorities could sue, so could central government entities-in either
case actions would "place an undesirable fetter on freedom of speech." Id. at 549. The House
of Lords did not reach the ground principally relied on by the Court of Appeals, Article 10 of
the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Id. at 550 (referring
to the lower court decision and Article 10). The House of Lords specifically noted that the lo-
cal authority as an entity was different from the individual officers thereof suing as individuals:
A publication attacking the activities of the authority will necessarily be an attack on the
body of councillors which represents the controlling party, or on the executives who
carry on the day-to-day management of its affairs. If the individual reputation of any of these
is wrongly impaired by the publication any of these can himself bring proceedings for
defamation.
Id. (emphasis added). In addition, the controlling entity had the right to respond publicly and
in the council chamber. Id.
225
' See supra text accompanying notes 16-29, 79-90, 141-45; infra text accompanying notes
403-44, 470-71.
26 City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 90-91 (I1. 1923) ("Where any person by
speech or writing seeks to persuade others to violate existing law or to overthrow by force or
other unlawful means the existing government, he many be punished, but all other utterances
or publications against the government must be considered absolutely privileged."); Weymouth
Township Bd. of Educ. v. Wolf, 429 A.2d 431, 433 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981) (acknowledg-
ing special constitutional protection of criticism of government).
2 The seditious libel analogy applies only, however, to governments in the traditional sense
of the term and not to non-traditional entities, such as the self-styled Provisional Government of
New Afrika, a group seeking independent government status within the United States. See Pro-
visional Gov't of New Afrika v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 104, 110 (D.D.C. 1985)
("Since the Provisional Government exercises no sovereignty over ABC... this libel suit threat-
ens democracy no more than a libel suit filed by any kind of political organization.").
228 Cf infra text accompanying notes 270-81.
See Edgartown Police Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Johnson, 522 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Mass. 1981)
(concluding that since none of defendant's statements singled out any individuals, the state-
ments were directed at the police department as a government body).
[Vol. 6:5
SMALL TOWN POLICE FORCES
held that New York Times had "specifically and forcefully 23° rejected
such an argument-that the individuals comprising the government
entity were individually libeled when, in fact, no individuals were
identified or "singled out."
231
Despite the absence of precedent and in the face of Goldwater v.
Ginzburg,32 where the Second Circuit upheld a damage award for a
U.S. senator who was running for president, 33 defense counsel in the
simultaneous Westmoreland v. C.B.S.23 4 and Sharon v. Time, Inc.23 5 libel
trials attempted to equate the plaintiffs' statuses as high government
officials at the time of their defamed conduct with suits for libels on
government.23 6 Only the Sharon judge resolved the issue, rejecting the
argument as unsupportable, citing the "vast difference" between a se-
ditious libel action where truth was no defense and a defamed offi-
cial's attempt to vindicate his reputation with the requisite burden of
proving falsity and constitutional malice.3 7
230 Id. at 1152.
231 See id. at 1153 ("Public authorities must not be permitted to stifle commentary concerning
their conduct by simply substituting individuals as plaintiffs in a defamation action.").
232 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970) (mem.).
233 Id. at 327, 335-43 (involving a phony psychiatric poll concerning Senator Goldwater's fit-
ness for the Presidency). In applying New York Times' qualified privilege the court emphasized
the breadth of what was relevant to Senator Goldwater's fitness: "By seeking election to the of-
fice of President of the United States, Senator Goldwater invited the press and the public to
scrutinize every aspect of his life, public and private alike." Id. at 335 (emphasis added). The court
felt that inquiry into his mental health was appropriate "in an age of powerful nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons capable of massive destruction." Id.
234 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
235 599 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
236 Sharon, 599 F. Supp. at 554; Westmoreland, 596 F. Supp. at 1172. The New York Times analy-
sis of the aspersion-of-the-President aspect of the Sedition Act of 1798 does not support an abso-
lute right to defame the President as the embodiment of the federal government with impunity.
It is clear that the act as a whole was treated as invalid under the "broad consensus" in the "court
of history," for asJefferson said, it was "a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if Congress had
ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 276 (1964). However, the Supreme Court's analysis in Garrison and the First Circuit's in
Goldwater tell us that both a civil action by a defamed plaintiff and a narrowly drawn criminal
statute incorporating the "calculated falsehood" standard as to aspersions on the President as
an individual would likely survive constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, in City of Chicago, relied on in
New York Times, the Illinois Supreme Court made this exact point-the Sedition Act would have
been constitutional as to prosecution for the defamation "of the President or any other per-
son... but in so far as it sought to make criminal any defamation of the government or of the
administration in power it has been generally considered to be unconstitutional." City of Chi-
cago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 88-89 (Ill. 1923); see also the analysis of the California stat-
utes involving imputations of misconduct to a particular police officer discussed infra note 439.
237 Sharon, 599 F. Supp. at 554-55. Query whether a head of state of an autocratic regime
would be treated differently. The courts might be tempted to view such individuals as "inextri-
cably linked with and symboliz [ing] their respective governments and that any criticism of them
was, in fact, criticism of government qua government." Elder, supra note 24, at 610 n.135. A
certiorari request in Gannet Co. v. De Roburt, 733 F.2d 701, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1984), made an ab-
solute immunity claim based on the argument that "foreign leaders using vast national treasury
May 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The consensus view 3 of the decisions delineating the seditious li-
bel/"powerlessness of government" rule is that the latter rule does not
apply where individual members of a small government unit sue un-
der the small group defamation rule,3 9 for example, individual mem-
bers of a township board of education,"4 or where the prevailing cir-
cumstances at the time of publication suggest that the publication
referred particularly to or "singled out" the plaintiff.4 ' The latter
rule is well-illustrated by Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc.,242 where a
public official sued Playboy for publishing an article detailing the ex-
cesses of a CIA-generated program advising foreign police in Latin
America and elsewhere, implying that the official was involved in tor-
ture.243 Even though plaintiff was mentioned by name in the article,
the district court interpreted New York Times and Rosenblatt as mandat-
ing that defamation "specifically and explicitly"244 libel plaintiff-no
defamation personal to him could be implied from statements con-
demnatory of government.
The Seventh Circuit rejected the district court's reasoning, con-
cluding that libelous inferences may be as "clear and perhaps more
damaging"2 4  than explicit imputations just because of their
resources" were endeavoring to stifle criticism of their countries' official activities. 11 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 112 (Dec. 11, 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985) (mem.).
238 See infra notes 239-40, 288-335. The case of Johnson v. Delta-Democrat Pub. Co., 531 So. 2d
811, 814-15 (Miss. 1988), is not to the contrary. In that "metaphorical language" constituting
'name calling and verbal abuse" directed at the city council (of which plaintiff was a member)
was found nonactionable under both common law fair comment and the First Amendment
opinion doctrines.
239 See Weymouth Township Bd. of Educ. v. Wolf, 429 A.2d 431, 433 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1981) (preventing a board of education from claiming libel as an entity but acknowledging the
right of individual members to do so); Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 793
& n.4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) ("[E]xplicit reference .. . to the group prevents a libel on govern-
ment challenge"); see also infra text accompanying notes 235, 283-328.
240 See also Wolf 429 A.2d at 433 (affirming the right of "individual members of a governmental
unit" to sue (emphasis added)).
241 O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 223, 226 (E.D. Ky. 1990) (affirming
magistrate's finding that a material issue of fact remained where journalist had arguably de-
famed a particular member of the class).
242 841 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
243 The passage at issue said:
Torture in Uruguay, said the array of authorities, had been "common," "normal," "ha-
bitual" before 1969. And the U.S. advisor who had been Mitrione's predecessor for four
years, whose office was on the first floor of the Montevideo jefatura, where torture re-
portedly took place and the screams of victims reverberated, who by his own account had
intimate and influential relations with the Uruguayan police, was Adolph Saenz.
From Montevideo, allegations of torture by his police clients would follow Saenz
through subsequent assignments in Colombia and Panama.
Id. at 1312.
244 Saenz v. Playboy Enters. Inc., 653 F. Supp. 552, 560-61 (E.D. Ill. 1987).
243 Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1314.
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indefiniteness. 246 The federal district court's opinion was far too ex-
pansive2 47 and allowed for "the spectre of heinous abuse by crafty and
mischievous authors whose subtle art of insinuation is honed for de-
struction."4 s The court also rejected the district court's interpreta-
tion of New York Times-Rosenblatt as barring Saenz's attempt to show
direct linkage and implied "personal involvement" in torture.249  In
fact, Rosenblatt specifically contemplated a libel action based on some-
thing other than an explicit imputation "specifically leveled" against
complainant, that is, by implication.50 In ringing language the court
concluded that a defendant could not, "without impediment of law,
trammel a public official by 'surreptitious and insidious implication'
under the pretense of governmental critique., 25' To deny libel by in-
nuendo2 would
open Pandora's Box from which countless evils may spring. A legal fic-
tion denying... clearly discernable, though not explicit charges, exposes
public officials to baseless accusations and public mistrust while promot-
ing an undisciplined brand of journalism both unproductive to society
253
and.., unprotected by constitutional considerations.
In another decision, a New York state court interpreted New York
Times-Rosenblatt as authorizing the imposition of liability where plain-
tiff lottery director provided extrinsic evidence connecting himself
personally to articles referring to the Lottery and "Lottery officials."
2 5 4
In the first series, all but one were published daily over an eleven-day
period. In a number of articles plaintiff was specifically identified as
246 Id. See the well-reasoned decision in O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218
(E.D. Ky. 1990), affd, 931 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1991), where the court held the following state-
ment in an article to be libelous per se and actionable in false light, when viewed in light of
other references and the "overall structure" of the article, which was about a public meeting
concerning allegations of sexual misconduct of high school teachers with students: "None of
the speakers directly linked the request with the clash between Francis [a student terminated
for fighting] and Hunt [a teacher] but most referred to 'allegations' and 'charges'surrounding the inci-
dent [a fight between Francis and Hunt] that could prove harmful to a teacher's career." Id. at 224.
One added reference was the principal's statement confirming receipt of a complaint by a sev-
enteen-year-old female student against Hunt. Id. The court noted the defendant conceded
that the New York Times "of and concerning" restraints under the First Amendment would be
unavailable in such a case where plaintiff was "personally and specifically defamed." Id. at 226.
247 See Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1316 (reasoning that to conclude such a requirement from Rosenblatt
takes the Supreme Court's language out of its "proper context").
248 Id. at 1314.
249 Id. at 1315. The court noted that identification by position or name was recognized as
important by New York Times. Id. Saenz's name was specifically and explicitly used multiple
times in the passages that purportedly defamed him. Id. at 1316.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 1317.
252 On libel by implication concerning public persons see ELDER, supra note 2, §1:7, at 29
n.25.
253 Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1317.
254 Bruno v. New York News, Inc., 456 N.Y.S.2d 837, 839-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
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head of the lottery and its chief public defender. His photo was at-
tached to one editorial. He also proffered evidence of angry letters
from Lottery participants identifying him in the same language used
in the articles. This provided a sufficient link.25  In another article
several months later, references to "state officials" were treated the
same way. Specific references to him elsewhere in the article and the
readership's letters recognizing him as the source of the Lottery's dif-
ficulties sufficed to meet the "of and concerning" requirement.
By comparison, another decision carefully analyzing defendant's
critical accounts of the federal investigation and "cover-up" of the
death of Clinton aide Vincent Foster found that plaintiff had not met
his burden of proving the "of and concerning" requirement as to
criticisms of the "Park Police, 25 7 generally,2y5 or its official reports,259 in
which defendant had not participated. Nor had he met the require-
ment as to references to the "federal officials",2 6 who investigated the
death, as the court noted that defendant Ruddy's report carefully dis-
tinguished the initial search in which plaintiff participated briefly from
the subsequent investigation and report in which he also had not par-
ticipated . Implicitly, the court found the groups identified in the
"cover-up" were large and amorphous entities implicating "imper-
sonal criticisms of government 262 and plaintiff had not otherwise met
his burden of proving the "of and concerning" requirement.
26 3
25 See id. at 840 ("Therefore, we think the link to plaintiff was sufficiently established to pre-
vent dismissal of the action with respect to the News' charges against the Lottery which did not
specifically refer to him.").
See id. at 842 (stating that the damaging references to plaintiff created a triable issue as
discussed in Rosenblatt); cf Early v. Toledo Blade, 720 N.E.2d 107, 122-24, 126-27, 129, 133
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (applying the common law "of and concerning" requirement in finding
non-actionable a large number of general newspaper articles and editorials about Toledo police
that never mentioned plaintiffs).
257 Fornshill v. Ruddy, 891 F. Supp. 1062, 1071 (D. Md. 1995), affd, 89 F.3d 828 (4th Cir.
1996). The court noted that plaintiff was one of 650 Park Police, 430 of whom lived in the D.C.
metro area. Id. at 1064.
25 Plaintiff tried to segregate himself as one of only three Park Police mentioned anywhere in
the Ruddy report, but the court found no material issue of fact as to "of and concerning" based
on the overall content of the report. Id. at 1071.
259 Id.
60 Id. Such "investigating officials extend far beyond" the members of plaintiff's Park Police.
Id.
261 See id. ("Ruddy clearly distinguishes between those who participated in the search efforts
for Foster's body and those who subsequently investigated Foster's death.").
262 Id. at 1070. The court stated the "of and concerning" element was a First Amendment
requirement when the complaint involved such "impersonal criticisms of government." Id.
263 See id. at 1072 (noting that no affidavit of plaintiff or others who knew him and read the
report confirmed they viewed it as "of and concerning" him).
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As the Supreme Court itself has recognized , 6 clearly a libel victim
can be a readily ascertainable person even though mentioned only by
title. For example, the libeler cannot insulate himself from liability
merely by referring to "the sheriff2 6 or an unnamed judge in a par-
ticular trial.2 6 As an early criminal libel trial evidenced, in the "con-
duct of particular trials, courts are not impersonal." 67  Thus, a state-
ment that a judge in a high-profile case "busied himself with the
prosecution" so that criminal defendants could be swiftly convicted
and hanged was prosecutable. Unlike Sullivan, where there was not
even "an oblique reference" by name or position, such defamatory al-
legations ofjudicial malfeasance would be read as imputing "personal
involvement" 26 9 to the judge.
264 See supra notes 13, 180; see also Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1315 (7th Cir.
1988) (aligning itself with the Court in New York Times, recognizing that identification of a com-
plainant-public official by position was an "important factor").
265 Neal v. Huntington Publ'g Co., 223 S.E.2d 792, 796 (W. Va. 1976). The court rejected
the suggestion that plaintiff was "an anonymous member of a libeled class." The defamation
was "rather pointedly singular" in attacking an "ascertainable" person, the sheriff of the county
in which the defendant-newspaper was published. Id. at 795-96 n.1.
266 See, e.g., Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293, 1300 n.10 (Colo. 1994) ("While the letter does
not refer to judge Keohane by name, the evidence at trial established that the letter was widely
understood as referring to Judge Keohane .... As such, any defamatory meaning is properly
regarded as a defamation of Judge Keohane."); Cole v. Commonwealth, 300 S.W. 907, 908-11
(Ky. 1927) (affirming conviction of libel against defendants who identified a particular individ-
ual by referring to his title as judge).
267 Cole, 300 S.W. at 911.
268 Id. at 908-11. In the companion conviction there was not even a specific reference to "the
judge." There were only references to the defendants "being rushed to the gallows by farcical
trial," "legal lynching," and "mob law," which were viewed as "direct attack(s) and reflection(s)"
on the trial judge. Id. at 911. The court's logic is compelling and should not be eviscerated by
confusion with the unmeritorious nature of the libel victim. The case bears interesting resem-
blances to New York Times--in this case a small town judge went after the big city (Louisville)
progressive press for trying to shed light on racial injustice. It is worthy of note that the un-
named judge, Ruby Lafoon, became so well known in this case despite the absence of media
references to him by name that he was elected Governor in 1931. See Robert A. Leflar, The So-
cial Utility of the Criminal Law of Defamation, 34 TEX. L. REv. 984, 988 (1956) (characterizing the
case as also having "intimations of racial as well as political retribution").
269 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288-92 (1976); cf. Huyen v. Driscoll, 479
N.W.2d 76, 78-79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that "general criticisms of government pro-
cedures and policies," such as "departmental meetings are irregular and infrequent, and generally unso-
licitative of staff observations and opinion," "the current environment.. . is non-conducive to problem
resolution and that the overall mission of the Department is lost in a cloud of hostility and divisiveness,"
and "the policy forbidding staff attendance at in-house workshops conducted by Employee Rela-
tions was ill-considered," were not actionable under the "well settled" rejection of supervisory
linkage as alone sufficient under New York Times). While much of this case involved statements
opinionative in tone, at least some of the statements could have been viewed as "of and con-
cerning" plaintiff if testimony were adduced that people who worked in the entity viewed him as
the target and the policies were ones he promulgated. For example, if the policy on staff atten-
dance at in-house workshops was issued under his signature and authority, the circumstances
known to at least some recipient-readers would provide the basis for an "of and concerning"
link. See supra note 119.
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By contrast, defamation of a large governmental group may in-
voke the seditious libel analogy by allowing an individual to sue for
what is in essence defamation of a governmental body27-a clear cor-
ollary of New York Times-Rosenblatt." An analysis of the decisions both
before New York Times and after makes it clear that courts have been
exceptionally sensitive to free expression concerns in the large gov-
ernmental group defamation scenario. Although the cases involv-
ing large governmental groupings are not as numerous as in the non-
governmental arena,73 the results are the same. Thus, it did not suf-
fice for an individual to sue for such "broad and general defama-
tion "211 where reference was made to a village police department and
sheriff's department over many years,275 the FBI or general group of
FBI agents, 6 165 governmental employees,2 7  5000 police,278 deputies,
270 See supra text accompanying notes 187-231.' See supra text accompanying notes 30-145.
272 See Fornshill v. Ruddy, 891 F. Supp. 1062, 1070-72 (D. Md. 1995) (relying on New York
Times and holding that "state defamation law must comport with First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments [sic] considerations"), affid, 89 F.3d 828 (4th Cir. 1996); Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers,
Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 789 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) ("The rule was designed to encourage frank
discussions of matters of public concern .... Thus the incidental and occasional injury... is
balanced against the public's right to know."); McCullough v. Cities Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 833,
836-37 (Okla. 1984) (referring to Brady to find a broad free expression rationale underlying
the large group defamation rule in general). As the early case of Ryckman v. Delavan said,
[T]he great interests of society require that it [the civil remedy] should not be made to
apply. It is far better for the public welfare that some occasional consequential injury to
an individual, arising from general censure of his profession, his party, or his sect, should
go without remedy, than that free discussion on the great questions of politics, or morals,
or faith, should be checked by the dread of embittered and boundless litigation.
25 Wend. 186, 199 (N.Y. 1840). For an analysis of the First Amendment underpinnings of the
"of and concerning" requirement see SMOLLA, supra note 15, § 4:40.50.
27s See generally ELDER, supra note 2, §§ 1:31, 1:35 (discussing defamation in the context of
large groups and governmental groups).
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. a (1977).
25 See Wainman v. Bowler, 576 P.2d 268, 270 (Mont. 1978) (holding that the action was not
libelous per se since it was not "specifically directed" at the claimant); see also Farrell v. Triangle
Publ'ns, Inc., 159 A.2d 734, 736 (Pa. 1960) (holding that no claim existed as to an utterance
"directed toward a class or group whose membership is so numerous that no one individual
member can reasonably be deemed an intended object of the defamatory matter").
276 See Price v. Viking Press, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 641, 646 (D. Minn. 1985) ("[G]eneral refer-
ences to a group of FBI agents or the FBI itself is [sic] not actionable defamation."). Even if
linked to a particular city near the reservation at issue, the court rejected the suggestion that
the number generally assigned was as few as ten, as this was not the number during the time in
question-the area was "replete" with FBI agents and federal marshals. Id. At least one specifi-
cation was even broader, referencing FBI conduct on "reservations" and when "AIM gathers."
The latter were nationwide. Id. at n.8.
277 SeeAlexis v. District of Columbia, 77 F. Supp. 2d 35, 41, 43-46 (D.D.C. 1999).
278 See L.A. Fire & Police Protective League v. Rogers, 86 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (Cal. Ct. App.
1970) ("[Pllainiff league cannot, as a matter of law, maintain an action for damagers for alleged
defamation of such a large group...."); see also Mullins v. Brando, 91 Cal. Rptr. 796, 805 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1970) (finding that, since none of the 5000 could sue under "very basic traditional
defamation principles," by definition, the police officers' association could not sue on their be-
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agents, and employees in a sheriffs office of over 740,279 "law en-
forcement in Eugene" and "the police in this community,"28 or
"prosecutors.",1'
Even in a large group context, however, circumstances known to
readers, viewers or hearers where a defamation is published may
equate to individual reference as effective as if plaintiff alone were
specified. 82 In these cases there is a "reasonable presumption of per-
sonal allusion., 283  For example, three officer-participants in a shoot-
out depicted as an execution were not "run-of-the-mill members, 28 4 of
a large group but "ascertainable persons"25 aimed at by defendants.
In a case like this, plaintiff officers were like the "unidentified but
identifiable police" in New York Times who actually performed the
purported illegalities.8 6 In another case the two unnamed of seven
"federal narcotics agents" involved in a particular incident met the
colloquium requirement as to those within the law enforcement enti-
ties involved who were familiar with the incident.
27
Paralleling the non-governmental area,288 significant precedent,
both before and after New York Times, has applied the small group
defamation rule to small governmental groupings, treating the
half). In dicta the Mullins opinion suggested the "impersonal criticism of government" aspect
of New York Times might apply to the group plaintiffs. 91 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01; see also O'Leary v.
Police Dep't, 409 N.Y.S.2d 676, 677-79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (denying an action to enjoin on
behalf of a class and individual members of two police recruiting classes to the N.Y.P.D).
29 SeeWebb v. Sessions, 531 S.W.2d 211, 212-13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (denying the claim as
a matter of law on the basis of group size).
280 Cushman v. Day, 602 P.2d 327, 330 & n.2, 332 & n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
281 Murray v. Bailey, 613 F. Supp. 1276, 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1985); see also Weston v. Commercial
Advertiser, 77 N.E. 660, 662 (N.Y. 1906) (remarking in dicta that an article stating generally that
all coroners in the state were corrupt would likely not be libelous as to any individual).
22 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A(b) & cmt. d (1977) ("[T]he circumstances
of publication [may] reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is particular reference to
the member." For example, "there may be circumstances that are known to the readers or
hearers and which give the words such a personal application to the individual that he may be
defamed as effectively as if he alone were named.").
283 Price v. Viking Press, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 641, 646 (D. Minn. 1985) (emphasis added).
284 Mullins v. Brando, 91 Cal. Rptr. 796, 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
285 Id.
286 See id. at 801. The court rejected the New York Times "of and concerning"/libel of gov-
ernment argument, correctiy concluding that it was limited to vicarious responsibility cases. Id.
at 801-02.
287 See Hansen v. Stoll, 636 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981). The two unnamed plain-
tiffs had the burden of proving colloquium. Id. at 1241. This is the general rule. See ELDER,
supra note 2, § 1:30, at 134. It was not necessary to show that the ordinary reader or every
reader would make the connection as long as it was "reasonable under the circumstances."
Hansen, 636 P.2d at 1241. Since the jury was appropriately instructed on group libel, the facts
of record supported a conclusion the defamatory publications were "sufficiently specific" to
identify the unnamed plaintiffs. Id.
288 For a discussion of non-governmental small-group defamation, see ELDER, supra note 2, §
1:32, at 150-55.
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defamation as reasonably understandable as referring to each individ-
ual member of the group. s9 Sometimes this small group is a subset of
a larger group, such as a group of police accused of specific miscon-
duct at a picketing site.290 In other cases it is defined by specific voca-
tional affiliation or description, such as physicians working for coro-
ners in a particular borough,291 the motorcycle police in a particular
city,2 92 or the doctors at a particular public hospital.29 ' Even vague de-
scriptions-village "officials"-have been justifiably covered. Courts
found that to local readers they were as clearly identifiable as if iden-
tified by name.29 More commonly, plaintiffs were allowed to sue as
individuals because a small governmental entity or group was specifi-
cally named or identified. This was treated as having "so affected and
particularized 2 95 them as individuals as to justify a finding of personal
reference. Thus, fully inclusive defamation29 6 gave standing to
289 See, e.g., Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 790 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)
(finding that, since the group included few persons, "reference to the individual reasonably
follows from the statement and the question of reference is left for the jury"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b (1977) ("When the group or class defamed is sufficiently
small, the words may reasonably be understood to have personal reference and application to
any member of it, so that he is defamed as an individual... [and] can recover for defamation.");
see also ELDER, supra note 2, § 1:32, at 150-51 (listing cases before and after New York Times that
applied the small group defamation rule to government groups).
29 See Cushman v. Edgar, 605 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that plaintiff po-
lice officers had a case for defamation against a union official who publicly accused plaintiffs of
misconduct against picketers); Cushman v. Day, 602 P.2d 327, 332 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (same).
29 See Weston v. Commercial Advertiser Ass'n, 77 N.E. 660, 661-62 (N.Y. 1906) (holding
defendant's article stating a borough's coroner's office was extorting money from family
members in order to allow them to avoid unnecessary autopsies was specific enough for a
physician working for one of the coroners in the office at issue to have an actionable claim).
The group of four coroners was also maligned. The entire group totaled eight. Id
292 Commercial Tribune Publ'g Co. v. Haines, 15 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Ky. 1929) (affirming the
lower court's finding that plaintiff motorcycle police officer succeeded in proving a claim of
defamation against a newspaper, which had published an article stating the town's motorcycle
police force-consisting of plaintiff and another officer-was neglecting its duties).
29 Bornmann v. Star Co., 66 N.E. 723, 724 (N.Y. 1903) (affirming a judgment for plaintiff
member of a group of twelve "physicians").
24 See DeHoyos v. Thornton, 18 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122-23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940) (finding that vil-
lage readers would "clearly and quite reasonably understand who was referred to... as being
dictated to by gangsters"). The article at issue in DeHoyos made reference to "our village affairs,"
"our officials," and the desirability of a "golden age" when persons of "brains plus horse sense
run our village right." Id. at 122. The court said there was "no room for doubt as to who were
the objects of her attack" in the local mind. Id. at 123; see also infra note 299; cf Arnold v. In-
gram, 138 N.W. 111, 114, 117, 119 (Wis. 1912) (involving much vaguer references to
"[o]fficials," "those who have served the city and the community in public office," "carry... into
office those who are utterly unworthy of public confidence," which did not specifically refer to
plaintiff district attorney any more than to other officers).
25 Wofford v. Meeks, 30 So. 625, 628 (Ala. 1901).
26 For more on the issue of less than fully inclusive reference, see supra text accompanying
notes 133-38, and infra notes 305-14.
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members of the following: town boards of trustees,"97 county commis-
sioners, city councils, criminal or civil juries,30 0 water boards, 0 '
boards of trustees of a school districts,
30 2 district election boards,
30 3
and precinct election officials.04
297 See Schomberg v. Walker, 64 P. 290 (Cal. 1901) (finding that the article referred to the
entire board, and that plaintiff was one of three board members actually involved in the matter
featured in the article); see also Noral v. Hearst Publ'ns, 104 P.2d 860, 863 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1940) (remarking that where an entire board of five supervisors of a specific place was defamed,
any individual member thereof could sue) (dicta).
298 See Wofford, 30 So. at 626 (finding that plaintiff has standing, as he was one of the "Third
Partyites" to whom the article referred); see also Price v. Viking Press, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 641, 645
(D. Minn. 1985) (interpreting Palmerlee as involving a group "few in number"); Palmerlee v.
Nottage, 138 N.W. 312, 313 (Minn. 1912) (following the Wofford court by affirming that a mem-
ber of a board of county commissioners had a cause of action against a newspaper that falsely
accused the entire board of corruption).
2" See Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel Co., 26 S.E.2d 209, 214 (W.Va. 1943). In the arti-
cle there were numerous references to city council and a couple of express references to plain-
tiff council member by name (in non-defamatory aspects) but not by identifying title. In the
editorial there was no reference to plaintiff's name or even to the city council as such. The ref-
erences were to "municipal authorities," "municipal authorities," "our governmental affairs,"
.city government," "city administration," and "city officials." The court upheld the claim, saying
the mayor and city council were a "small restricted group" of five persons. Id.
300 See Welch v. Tribune Pub. Co., 47 N.W. 562, 563, 565 (Mich. 1890) (criminal juror); see
also Byers v. Martin, 2 Colo. 605 (1875) (same); Smallwood v. York, 173 S.W. 380, 381-82 (Ky.
1915) (dicta); Boehmer v. Detroit Free Press, 53 N.W. 822, 823 (Mich. 1892) (interpreting
Welch); Carter v. King, 94 S.E. 4, 6 (N.C. 1917) ("It was as harmful to libel and slander the plain-
tiff collectively as one of the 11 jurors as it would have been to have libeled him individually.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b (1977) ("Thus the statement that 'That jury
was bribed' may reasonably be understood to mean that each of the twelve jurymen has ac-
cepted a bribe."). But cf infra note 369.
Compare the two recent companion decisions from Mississippi involving allegations by un-
named members of civil juries that a "60 Minutes" program entitled "Jackpot Justice" imputed
to them improper or corrupt behavior. In Beny v. Safer, 293 F. Supp. 2d 694, 704 (S.D. Miss.
2003), and Gale v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 772, 784 (S.D. Miss. 2003), the trial
judge dismissed the non-diverse individual defendants, finding fraudulent joinder. The court
analyzed the claims of the individual defendants only, and found that the small group defama-
tion rule of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 564A could not be met. Berry, 293 F. Supp. 2d at
704-05; Gales, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 782. The only references by the individual defendants were to
"juries" and "jurors" generally. The court viewed these references as involving the large group
of all countyjurors. It is important to emphasize that the court looked only at the individual co-
defendants' utterances, not the "entire utterance" published by "60 Minutes," refusing to hold
the individual defendants liable for impressions conveyed by the context of the program as a
whole. Clearly, however, the court intimated that the issue of liability of the media co-
defendants would entail an analysis of the "entire utterance"/context rule to determine
whether the average viewer would deem that ajury in a particular trial (for example, the diet
pill case mentioned in the broadcast) had been inclusively defamed. Berry, 293 F. Supp. 2d at
700; Gales, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 778, The small group defamation rule would then apply to the
individual jurors.
301 See McGuire v. Roth, 8 Ohio Misc. 92, (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1965) (affirming that the small
group defamation rule was consistent with New York Times, but holding that the particular
statement was not defamatory).
302 See Scott v. McCain, 250 S.E.2d 118, 120 (S.C. 1978) (holding that a member of the ma-
ligned board of trustess stated a claim under New York Times).
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Where the defamation is not fully inclusive, the cases are di-
vided."°  The (better)0 6 Restatement (Second) of Torts"7 rule allows
recovery where a "high degree of suspicion"s is suggested by the de-
famatory statement. Under this test where a "considerable propor-
tion of the group is included, the jury may view it as "a blanket
slur, reaching all.""' Clearly, however, disparaging one police officer
in a department of twenty-one did not suffice. Implicating one of
two prison guards in a train escape by Al Capone, however, defamed
each,1 2 as did depicting "some" of a group of high school English
teachers as sexually involved with students. 3 And where "a number
of" thirteen township commissioners were implicated, it was held
303 See Reilly v. Curtis, 84 A. 199, 199-200 (N.J. 1912) ("A sweeping charge of misconduct,
leveled against a public board without exception, necessarily points thefinger of condemnation at
every member thereof though none are named, and every member of the board may maintain an
action therefor." (emphasis added)).
See Ponder v. Cobb, 126 S.E.2d 67, 68-75 (N.C. 1962) (finding a jury had to decide
whether voting precinct officials were defamed by a political party chairman's statements alleg-
ing voter fraud to the group); supra notes 66-73, 176-77 and accompanying text.
s05 See Arcand v. Evening Call Pub. Co., 567 F.2d 1163, 1165 (1st Cir. 1977) (noting the lack
of uniformity among courts' treatment of non-fully inclusive defamatory statements).
M6 See ELDER, supra note 2, §1:33, at 155 (lauding this rule). But c.f Evans v. Dolcefino, 986
S.W.2d 69, 79 (Tex. App. 1999) (stating that no individual could sue for a defamation directed
"at less than all" of the small group of city building inspectors unless the defamation "singles
him out"), overruled on other grounds by Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 115-16
(Tex. 2000).
307 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. c (1977).
308 Id.; see also Arcand 567 F.2d 1163, 1164 (1st Cir. 1977) (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 564A cmt. c (1977)).
W9 Arcand, 567 F.2d at 1165; see also Cushman v. Day, 602 P.2d 327, 332 (Or. Ct. App. 1979)
(stating that a "significant portion" or "majority" would suffice).
3s Arcand, 567 F.2d at 1165.
s1 See id. The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts illustration rejecting collo-
quium in a case where only one of a group of twenty-five was portrayed as an automobile thief.
Id. at 1164-65 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §564A cmt. c, illus. 4 (1977)). In such
cases the scenario does not suggest one person's conduct epitomizes all group members. Al-
though conceding each member may feel some degree of discomfiture, "to predicate liability to
all members of a group on such an associational attitude would chill communication to the
marrow." Arcand, 567 F.2d at 1165; see also Grimes v. Swank Magazine, 15 Med. L. Rptr. 1231,
1233-34 (Ct. App. Cal. 1988) (following Arcand in a case involving two of twenty-one police offi-
cers implicated in sexual misbehavior in uniform). The Grimes court also found that prefatory
statements as to the fictitious nature of the portrayal eliminated any reasonable implication
plaintiffs were involved in the film. Id. at 1234.
312 Am. Broad.-Paramount Theatres v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873, 881-82 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962).
Alternatively, the plaintiff could rely on the extrinsic fact that the one portrayed in the televi-
sion presentation was not the guard in authority, the captain of the guard, and was thus the
plaintiff. Id. at 880.
313 See O'Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 223 (E.D. Ky. 1990) (indicating
that in such an example, a "small, defined portion of a larger group" could make out a defama-
tion claim, but finding that not to be the case in the matter at issue), affd, 931 F.2d. 893 (6th
Cir. 1991).
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"irrational, as well as unconscionable '' 14 not to let an individual
member sue.
Where to draw the dichotomy between large and small groups is
not without controversy.315 Undoubtedly, as a general rule, the larger
the group, the more difficult it is to show plaintiff is tainted by dis-
316paragement of the group. The Restatement (Second) of Torts1.
and most authorities18 adopt a "de facto maximum" "consistent rule
of thumb""3 limitation of twenty-five,20 following the analysis of the
leading case, Neiman-Marcus v. Lait,31 where the court allowed all of a
group of twenty-five salesmen to sue where the disparagement ex-
tended to "most."'22  Under this approach, none among forty-six
members of a street crimes unit accused of targeting minorities could
sue,323 nor could twenty-nine high school teachers implicated in
314 Farrell v. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc., 159 A.2d 734, 736-39 (Pa. 1960); see also Alvord-Polk, Inc.
v. F. Schumacher Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1015-16 (3rd Cir. 1994) (approving, but distinguishing, Far-
rell in the context of a group of twenty to twenty-five wallpaper dealers not involving "an easily
identifiable cohesive group" as in Farrell). The article in Farrell said the district attorney's inves-
tigators would question all thirteen commissioners. This suggested that none of the commis-
sioners was "above suspicion of knowledge, guilty or otherwise" of the imputed impropriety.
Farrell, 159 A.2d at 739. The court applied an eminently sound, common sense approach, con-
cluding that certainly a "substantial number" of readers, especially those from plaintiffs town-
ship, knew of plaintiff's status as commissioner. Additionally, it was reasonable to conclude that
township readers who did not know all the commissioners' names were "impelled by the scan-
dalous nature of the charges" to determine who they were, leading almost inexorably to plain-
tiffs name being linked to the purported corruption. Id. at 738-39.
315 See Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (not-
ing that, despite some courts' focus on group size, "no definitive limitation has been set").
316 See O'Brien, 735 F. Supp. at 223 (noting that the court's own research found no case in
which a group of more than twenty-five had standing); McCullough v. Cities Serv. Co., 676 P.2d
833, 836 (Okla. 1984) (explaining the rationale as that "the larger the collectivity named in the
libel, the less likely it is that a reader would understand it to refer to a particular individual").
The underlying assumption for large group non-liability-that the reader will treat the state-
ment rationaly---is "not without challenge." Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 788-89 & n.2 (quoting Note,
Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 Yale L.J. 308, 311-13 (1979)).
3 7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b (1977) ("[T]he cases in which recovery
has been allowed usually have involved numbers of 25 or fewer." (emphasis added)).
318 See Bujol v. Ward, 778 So.2d 1175, 1178 (La. Ct. App. 2001) ("[M]ost authorities agree
that the group must consist of twenty-five or less members in order for the plaintiff to state a
cause of action for group defamation."); see also ELDER, supra note 2, § 1:32, at 153 (characteriz-
ing opposition to the numerical guideline as a "small minority view").
319 Alexis v. District of Columbia, 77 F. Supp. 2d 35, 41, 44 (D.D.C. 1999).
320 See Alexis, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 41, 44-45 (citing the twenty-five-member maximum discussed
in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 564A cmt. b (1977)); Bujol, 778 So. 2d at 1178, 1180 (cit-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b (1977)).
3521 13 F.R.D. 311, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
a2 Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. c, illus. 4 (1977) (adopting Neiman-
Marcus v. Lait).
323 See Bujol 778 So. 2d at 1178, 1180 (noting also that the imputation was not specifically
directed to members of the group inclusively).
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committing adultery with students.3 2 4 This mechanistic approach125 to
small group analysis is wholly artificial and arbitray. 2 1 Imagine trying
to justify why a group of twenty-five inclusively (or largely inclusively)
defamed teachers can sue as individuals" v but a group of twenty-nine
inclusively defamed cannot. Even the Restatement (Second) of Torts
has conceded that it is impossible to provide "definite limits.
3 28
Although decidedly a minority view, a few well-reasoned cases re-
ject size alone as controlling in favor of a focus on "the intensity of
the suspicion 3 11 put on the plaintiff. In one decision, an all-inclusive
imputation of amphetamine use to a state university football team of
sixty to seventy players authorized a suit by a fullback on the alternate
squad who had played in nine of the team's eleven games.3 ° In a
later case, twenty-seven of a group of fifty-three police officers were
allowed to sue for an imputation that they were accessories to (eight-
een) other indicted officers. 3 1 Finding an absolute ceiling on size un-
justified and arbitrary, the court weighed size against "definiteness in
number and composition" and "prominence of the group and the
324 See O'Brien, 735 F. Supp. at 222-26 (rejecting both libel and false light claims). On the
identification/"of and concerning" issue in "false light" privacy, see DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY
TORTS § 4:4 (Supp. 2003). Comparable rules on identifiability also apply to the public disclo-
sure and appropriation-publicity torts. See id. §§ 3:4, 6:5.
525 See infra notes 326-28. There is "no compelling logic 'in allowing a greater number of
wrongs to afford a lesser degree of liability'" under group defamation theory. Brady v. Ottaway
Newspapers, 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 792 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (quoting Mason C. Lewis, The Individ-
ual Member's Right to Recoverfor Defamation Levelled at a Group, 17 U. MIAMI L.Q. 519, 535 (1963)).
326 See SMOLLA, supra note 15, § 4:71 (citing "[s]everal well-reasoned decisions" adopting the
more liberal "intensity of suspicion" test).
327 See ELDER, supra note 2, § 1:32, at 154 n.36 (concluding that disallowing twenty-nine
teachers from suing while allowing twenty-two branch churches to sue, as was the case in Church
of Scientology v. Siegelman, 481 F. Supp. 866, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), "creates an essentially arbitrary,
indefensibly rigid, and mindless distinction"); see also McCullough v. Cities Serv. Co., 676 P.2d
833, 836 (Okla. 1984) (noting that the failure of the cases to define a "precise numerical divid-
ing line ... demonstrates the weakness of slavish reliance" on the "numbers alone" approach).
328 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b (1977); see McCullough, 676 P.2d at 836
(citing the cmt. b caveat, noting that no court at that time had held that a group of twenty-six
was "too large" to allow an individual plaintiff to recover).
329 Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 52 (Okla. 1962) (quoting Note, 34 COLUM. L.
REv. 1322, 1325 (1931)); see Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, 792-95 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981) (criticizing an absolute numerical requirement in favor of the "intensity of sus-
picion" standard); McCullough, 676 P.2d 833, 835-37 (restating the criteria and rationale in de-
tail); see also O'Brien, 735 F. Supp. at 223, n.4 (noting the test but not resolving the issue).
33 Fawcett, 377 P.2d at 51-52. Such a player would be identifiable to those familiar with the
team and its players' contributions. Id. at 52. Note that an earlier Oklahoma case, Owens v.
Clark, 6 P.2d 755, 759-60 (Okla. 1931), held that a libel of "certain members" of the state su-
preme court was not actionable as to any individual member thereof. Fawcett distinguished
Owens based on its non-inclusive nature without endeavoring to defend it. Fawcett, 377 P.2d at
50. The disparaging tenor of the brief Fawcett analysis and Owens' inconsistency with the liberal
philosophy of the "intensity of suspicion" test suggest that Owens is no longer good law.
331 Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 792-95.
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prominence of the individual within the group.,332 Applying these
criteria, it noted that police officers in small, local communities such
as the city in question are generally viewed as "prominent public offi-
cials,03 3 since their environment is one in which citizens tend to know
their fellow citizens.3 4 The court specifically rejected any suggestion
that a constitutional defect existed under New York Times-Rosenblatt, as
the disparagement involved "explicit reference to a specifically de-
fined group.0
3 5
Viewed against this backdrop, only two decisions can even argua-
bly be seen as presaging Dean v. Dearins 35 per se rule rejecting the
small group defamation rule on First Amendment grounds. In one,
Deaver v. Hinel,37 plaintiff, a former county sheriff, initially com-
plained about a column referencing "reports of harassment, incom-
petency, lawbreaking apparently by law enforcement."'3 Plaintiff was
not named.339 In the second claim, mention was made in a letter to
the editor about "recent activities of our law enforcement officials in this
county" and their engagement in "felonious acts."3 40 The only refer-
ence was to plaintiff by office-the letter portrayed these "officials" as
"fraternizing in public with our present Sheriff.3 4' The court prop-
erly viewed the latter associational connection as not tainting plaintiff
as a wrongdoer.
42
The court found Deaver's arguments to be indistinguishable from
Sullivan's, that is, as based solely on his "overall responsibility" and
"perforce directed specifically... at him.3 143 It also rejected as inac-
curate any suggestion that the "statements. .. necessarily concerned
him" as the sole law enforcement official in the county.3 44 Testimony
had established there were at least four deputies and the broad "law
enforcement" class could also refer to the county attorney and court
332 Id. at 793.
333 Id. at 795 & n.5. A police officer was held to be a "public official" under the "well settled"
rule. Id. This is the overwhelming view of the voluminous case law, although it is not necessar-
ily compelled by Rosenblatt or its "night watchman" example. See Elder, supra note 24, at 675-78
(discussing the difficulties in attempting to apply public official status to all law enforcement
personnel); supra note 145 and accompanying text.
334 Brady, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
935 Id. at 793 n.4.
336 561 S.E.2d 686 (Va. 2002).
337 391 N.W.2d 128 (Neb. 1986).
338 Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
339 See id. at 133 ("In his column, Hinel makes no reference to Deaver.").
340 Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
341 Id.
M See id. at 133-34 ("[The statement] suggests at most an association between the former
sheriff and those who allegedly committed the acts complained of.").
343 Id. at 134.
344 Id.
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personnel.4 In other words, the class was not a small and clearly de-
fined one composed of plaintiff and four deputies. The court also
did an independent review under a heightened proof standard
("clear and convincing"34 6 evidence) of testimony proffered to sup-
port the purported "specific attacks" and found it wanting.347
Lastly, and most important, in the summarizing paragraph the
court declined to find that plaintiff had shown "with convincing clar-
ity" s that the statements at issue were false"9 "with respect to him. '50
"To be sure, the observations... seem to be accurate, general ac-
counts""1 of actions of "a number of" county "law enforcement per-
sonnel."3 ' Thus, "[b] eyond stating the truth," they "merely constituted
fair comment on governmental activity, protected speech under the first
amendment."3 3 The latter should be read as the essence of the
Deaver opinion-that the plaintiff's claim failed because the pur-
ported defamation constituted either absolutely privileged opinion or
qualifiedly privileged "fair comment" speech based on true facts. 54
In another decision, Andrews v. Stallings,151 the court acknowledged
that the First Amendment should not be interpreted as "automati-
cally"3 6 proscribing group defamation actions, but cited several legal
commentators for the view that courts should err in close decisions
45 Id. at 135.
346 Id. There was no discussion of this heightened standard. It appears to be inconsistent
with the overwhelming common law rule. See ELDER, supra note 2, § 1:30, at 135 n.3 (noting
that only a couple of states have adopted the "clear and convincing" standard). This elevated
standard is not constitutionally mandated for the "of and concerning" requirement. See supra
note 31.
347 One witness viewed it as only referring to "the sheriff's office." This did not even meet the
vicarious responsibility-as-to-those-in-charge evidence found constitutionally insufficient in New
York Times. Deaver's own testimony merely replicated Sullivan's--that he was implicated based
on his status as the hierarchical superior. A third witness testified that she perceived the col-
umn, which did not reference even his position, as "prosecuting Dave." This vague testimony
was constitutionally insufficient to meet the requirement the libel "clearly referred" to plaintiff.
Deaver, 391 N.W. at 135.
348 Id.
M9 Clearly, plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity. See infra note 418 and accompanying
text (discussing plaintiffs' burden of proof); see also supra note 26 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing "clear and convincing" standard).
350 Deaver, 391 N.W.2d at 135.
351 Id. (emphasis added).
52 Id.
353 Id. (emphasis added).
35 Milkovich v. LorainJournal Co., 497 U.S. 17-23 (1989), clarified the dictum in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974), as not justifying a separate opinion doctrine, but as
subsuming the issue in the provable-as-factually-false aspect of plaintiffs burden of proof. See
infra notes 418-20. For an analysis of the Court's limited opinion precedent prior to Gertz, see
ELDER, supra note 2, § 8:11, at 34-39.
355 892 P.2d 611 (Ct. App. N.M. 1995).
356 Id. at 617. Incongruously, the court cited Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. as support for
this position. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 315, 329, 331-35.
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on the side of finding the matter "of and concerning" government.35 7
In analyzing the generally amorphous multiple statements therein al-
leged to be actionable, the court cryptically stated twice that state-
ments explicitly referencing the "mayor and council" did not refer to
plaintiff council member personally. 58 It is clear, however, from the
court's analyses that these cryptic asides were a minor aspect of the
opinion, if not dicta, and that the essential basis was a failure to meet
Milkovich 6 provable-as-factually-false requirement.359  An analysis of
the items in question suggests that they involved exceedingly amor-
phous matters in a quintessentially opinionative context (editorials
36'
in the political area562) wholly inappropriate for actionability before
or after Milkovich.
In an excellent concurrence, Judge Hartz agreed with the failure
to show falsity/opinion aspects of the majority in Andrews but not with
its references to "of and concerning" and its conclusion that refer-
ences to the "village" or "Council" were nonactionable "regardless of
the nature of the statement or whether the context of the publication estab-
lishes that the statement is focused on a particular individual3 63 In a
trenchant analysis of New York Times and Rosenblatt, he eviscerated the
majority's stated view-that is, that a statement will be deemed privi-
leged as "a libel on government" if it can legitimately so interpreted-
357 Andrews, 892 P.2d at 617.
M8 Id. at 618.
359 Id. at 618-19, 621. A third discussion involved one of a series of ten rhetorical questions
directed at the village concerning the departure of the city manager-"Did you, Mr. Norwood,
get tired of the village's appearance of impropriety by having the same people serve on several
boards where money switches hands."-and specifically relied on the defamation statute's "of
and concerning" requirement as to reference to the "village." Id. at 617. The Court also cited
to New York Times and Rosenblatt, and treated it as a libel of a governmental entity. Id. at 616-17.
See supra text accompanying notes 30-73, 91-145. The material also appears to have been
wholly opinionative in a context-involving rhetorical questions and the political area-courts
would otherwise find nonactionable under Milkovich. See ELDER, supra note 2, § 8:13, at 46-48
(discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich and relevant precedent); id. § 8:26, at 77-
88. Lastly, a fourth claim based on vague statements that village police were instructed not to
restrain motorcyclists' activities during the rally was apparently resolved on the common law
ground the statement was not "clearly directed" at plaintiff. Andrews, 892 P.2d at 619.
3W Andrews, 892 P.2d at 618. The bases were an editorial entitled "Law and order took a vaca-
tion" and a statement in the article-"We don't agree with Ruidoso's mayor and council and
Ruidoso Downs' mayor who say that the problems [with the Motorcycle Rally] were no big
deal." Id. at 618. The editorial caption posed the question, "What happened?" and then be-
gan: "Ruidoso's Village Council is battling the budget, conducting hearings to form next year's
financial plan and chip away at what Mayor Victor Alonso said is an $800,000 deficit." The edi-
torial also said, "[wihat have these guys been doing while the deficit creeped up near the mil-
lion dollar mark?" Id. at 621. The court held that these implications or assertions of conflict of
interest violations were based on disclosed facts.
361 See ELDER, supra note 2, § 8:3, at 22-28 (noting the rationale of allowing readers, instead
of courts, to consider the basis for opnions published without underlying facts).
5 See generally id. § 8:26, at 77-88 (discussing the fact/opinion issue in the public arena).
36 Andrews, 892 P.2d at 627 (Hartz, J., specially concurring) (emphasis added).
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as at odds with both the Court's exaltation of substance over form36 and
its detailed analyses recognizing that both such cases were on their
faces impersonal discussions of government 65 This "well-intended
overkill" 6 by the majority was also inconsistent with the express pro-
vision of a remedy under New York Times' and Garrison's "mighty for-
tress3 67 for libel claims involving knowing or reckless falsehood: "[I] t
would be surprising if the Court cloaked such a statement with im-
munity just because the person making the statement was careful to
refer to the defamed individual only by title rather than by proper
name.
68
III. DEAN V. DEARING AND THE "OF AND CONCERNING" REQUIREMENT-
A WRONG-HEADED INTERPRETATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
The salvos in opposing briefs well illustrate the strong disagree-
ment between the parties as to prevailing First Amendment doctrine.
Appellant argued that small group defamation liability was "adhered
to across the nation," relied on § 564A and argued powerfully that
post-New York Times no other court, trial or appellate, had interpreted
it to mandate such a "blanket prohibition. 3 6  Appellee viewed appel-
lant's claim and §564A as not reflecting "predominant case law in this
area" and further criticized §564A as "ignor[ing] the constitutional
arguments plainly established in New York Times."370 As was suggested
earlier, appellant's arguments are more compelling.
As a framework for analyzing the Dean court's short opinion, it is
important to look at the type of defamation in Officer Dean's com-
plaint. Appellant featured one example in his reply brief.
M4 Id. at 628.
3 Id. at 628-29.
3 Id. at 629.
367 Id.
M Id. at 628.
M9 Opening Brief of Appellant at 3-4, 5, n.2, Dean v. Dearing 561 S.E.2d 686 (Va. 2002) (No.
011154); Reply Brief of Appellant at 1, Dean (No. 011154). Appellant noted that the group of
five to eight was a smaller group than the jury of twelve that was quoted as an example in Re-
statement (Second) of Torts §564A cmt. b (1977), and as an illustration in Ewell v. Boutwell, 121
S.E. 912, 914 (Va. 1924). Opening Brief of Appellant at 3-4, Dean (No. 011154). The author
has found only general dicta in one case interpreting Rosenblatt as proscribing reliance alone on
the small group defamation theory. See Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 841 F.2d 1309, 1316 (7th
Cir. 1988) ("[T]he Court reaffirmed its holding that an otherwise impersonal attack on gov-
ernmental operations cannot establish defamation of the administering officials notwithstand-
ing their relatively limited number and therefore readily identifiable nature.").
370 Brief of Appellee at 14 n.3, Dean (No. 011154). The court itself described Dearing's state-
ments in this way: "From February through November 1999, Dearing accused the police
department of intimidating witnesses, stealing property, harassment, misappropriation of
money, and improperly disposing of drug and gun evidence. These statements were published
in newspapers serving the Elkton community." Dean, 561 S.E.2d at 688.
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"'I am telling you that I have allegations, I have facts. Prove me wrong,'
Dearing said, '.... If you can sit here and say all these people are lying,
prove me wrong,' the mayor later added. 'Tell me that our law enforce-
ment is not running guns. I'm saying I have information that they are.
Tell me that they are not out here beating up our citizens, because I tell
you they are. Tell me that they are not out here harassing our citizens,
having young girls meeting them in the cemetery to keep from getting
tickets. You tell me it's not-it is.'
3 7 1
In addition, throughout the lengthy series of defamatory articles,
Dearing repeatedly referred to fifteen or more areas of criminal
wrongdoing attributed to the Elkton police.372 In one local article he
was quoted as saying he had received more than 200 phone calls from
town residents complaining of "police wrongdoing."
3 7 3
The media interpreted Dearing's charges as alleging that the Elk-
ton police were "rife with corruption "3 4-a characterization that any
fair-minded reading of the appendix of articles would amply justify.
Undoubtedly, this high-gauge shotgun approach would decimate the
reputations of individual members of a small group in a small town.3 75
Even the trial judge conceded how the broad charges of corruption
and laundry list of specific offenses were understood locally: "[T] he
Elkton police force has only five (5) to eight (8) officers, and many of
the citizens of Elkton would unquestionably understand that some or all of the
alleged defamatory remarks to apply to Plaintiff.
376
In a small town of just over 2000,377 with a small police force, the
city mayor, Dearing, made a lengthy series of public statements inside
and outside of city council meetings, reported at length in a series of
articles over several months in the local and other locally available
newspapers. Locals undoubtedly and reasonably understood that
some or all of the imputations applied to plaintiff, an unnamed
371 Reply Brief of Appellant at 1-2; Appellant's Appendix at 33, Dean (No. 011154); see also id.
at 154 (containing Circuit Court's Opinion and Order, at 2 (citing Dean v. Town of Elkton, 54
Va. Cir. 518, 519 (2001))).
372 Appellant's Appendix at 33, 36, 39, 49, Dean (No. 011154). The designations used were
"our law enforcement," "Town of Elkton's police department," "Elkton Police Department,"
and "Elkton police." Opening Brief of Appellant at 4, Dean (No. 011154).
373 Appellant's Appendix at 13, Dean (No. 011154) ("You would not believe some of the stuff
I have heard. And the sad thing is, I don't believe these people are lying."); id. at 19 (referenc-
ing nineteen notarized affidavits of "Elkton Police Department wrongdoing" expected to be
turned over to the county commonwealth's attorney, containing, according to Dearing, "19 spe-
cific accusations of police transgressions." These were characterized by Dearing as "only a few
and a test to see if any action will be taken before I send the more serious allegations forward");
id. at 43 (parallel remarks); id. at 45-46 (referencing "19 persons making allegations against the
town's police department and administration").
374 Id. at 47, 61.
375 See supra text accompanying notes 314, 333-34.
376 Dean, 54 Va. Cir. at 524 (emphasis added); see also Reply Brief of Appellant at 2 n.1, Dean
(No. 011154) (citing same, adding emphasis).
377 U.S. CENsUS BUREAU, ELKTON, VIRGINIA, FACT SHEET, at http://factfinder.census.gov.
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officer. The logic for a finding of "of and concerning" as to all of the
officers (including plaintiff) seemed incontrovertible. But the trial
court3 78 and the Virginia Supreme CourtO78 disagreed, holding that the
First Amendment was a per se bar to reliance on the small group
defamation rule to meet the "of and concerning" requirement.
After correctly noting that New York Times did not involve a small
group defamation setting, the court concluded nonetheless that it
"foreshadow[ed] . . . Rosenblatt v. Baer.""" Relying on the Court's
broad overstatement 38 2 rather than its limited holding,38 the Dean
court found that the use of the small group defamation rule "alone as
the basis for... 'of and concerning"' did "not survive constitutional
scrutiny." The court held that "[a] n allegedly defamatory statement
which imputes misconduct generally to a governmental group consti-
tutes libel of government, for which there is no cause of action in
American jurisprudence."'
Under the court's analysis, defamed public officials like Dean
could only fulfill the "of and concerning" requisite by providing ex-
trinsic proof of one of the following: specific implication of the indi-
vidual member or each member of the small group.3 85 However, ex-
trinsic evidence that third persons interpreted the defamation as
applying to plaintiff could not be "based solely upon a plaintiffs mem-
bership in the referenced group."386 Finding that plaintiff's pleading
contained no allegations showing how the articles "reference [plain-
tiff] specifically or could be understood to do so" other than on his
status as a police officer in the maligned group, 7 the court upheld
the trial's grant of demurrer, refusing to allow such extrinsic facts to
be adduced at trial.m The court upheld this extraordinary remedy
378 Appellant's Appendix at 153-64, Dean (No. 011154); Dean, 54 Va. Cir. at 525.
379 Dean, 561 S.E.2d at 687-90.
30 See id. at 689 (referring to Supreme Court precedent to support its contention).
381 Id.
32 See id. (finding that Rosenblatt rejected, as the equivalent of a libel on government, the
view that a jury could find "of and concerning" based on the fact that the publication "'cast sus-
picion indiscriminately on the small number of persons who composed the former manage-
ment group, whether or not it found the imputation of misconduct was specifically made of and
concerning [the plaintiff)'" (quoting Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 79-80)).
383 See supra text accompanying notes 112-38.
5 Dean, 561 S.E.2d at 689 (emphasis added). For a laudatory analysis of Dean, see SMOLLA,
supra note 15, §§ 4:69, 4:76.
385 Dean, 561 S.E. 2d at 689. It is unclear what the court envisions. Cf supra text accompany-
ing notes 241-63, 282-87.
386 Dean, 561 S.E.2d at 689 (emphasis added).
387 Id.
no Id. at 689-90. Appellant correctly interpreted New York Times as only requiring production
of such extrinsic evidence at trial. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 4, Dean (No. 011154); infra
notes 423-31.
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despite its prior approval of the leading small group defamation deci-
sion in its own leading post-New York Times opinion. 89
The Dean opinion misapplied Rosenblatt as controlling First
Amendment jurisprudence in several ways. First, it inexplicably ig-
nored the clear implication that Rosenblatt's limitation of small group
defamation would not apply to explicit statements that the entire
governmental entity was corrupt and its corollary, that is, that the ex-
press charge itself might alone suffice to demonstrate the defamatory
charge was specifically directed at each small group member. 39 0  Sec-
ond, the Dean court ignored the very specific defect the Court seized
upon in Rosenblatt in invalidating the jury's "too broad" discretion to
find "of and concerning" in the doubly implicit scenario-that it suf-
ficed that Baer showed that the defamation "could have been" "di-
rected" at him "as one of a small group."391 The discretion found in
this italicized language was the true raison d'etre of Rosenblatt, illustrat-
392ing the problems inherent in a some-but-less-than-all scenario, a
scenario the Dean court specifically rejected, conceding as it did, that
the statements "impute misconduct generally to a governmental
group." 93 Third, the court ignored Rosenblatt's response in the dou-
bly implicit setting to the argument that the instruction directed the
39 See Opening Brief of Appellant at 6, Dean (No. 011154) (citing Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325
S.E.2d 713, 737-40 (Va. 1985)). The Gazette, Inc. court cited Ewell v. Boutwell, 121 S.E. 912, 914
(Va. 1924), discussed supra note 369, approvingly and quoted from Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 564 cmt. b (1977). Gazette, Inc., 325 S.E.2d at 738. The companion case to Gazette, Inc.
involved a case of purported child abuse depicted as a homicide in which a fictitious name for
the child was used, but where the identical facts surrounding the death of plaintiffs' child were
revealed. The court affirmed a finding of identification under an instruction requiring that the
article was "'intended to refer to the plaintiff, directly or indirectly, and that it is reasonably
probable that members of the public who read the article would understand it as referring to
them.'" Id. at 739. The court affirmed that the trial court properly allowed the jury to find "of and
concerning." Id. The Dean court appears oblivious to the anomaly created: a common law to-
tality of the circumstances approach generally resolved by the jury in all "of and concerning"
cases other than the small group defamation context and an extremely circumscribed matter-of-
law-for-the-court approach in the small governmental group setting. This anomaly is further
exemplified by the same court's contemporaneous and quite justifiable decision in WJLA-TV v.
Levin, where it considered a series of defamations about the same plaintiff over a short period as
a collective unit for "of and concerning" purposes even where the publications identifying
plaintiff occurred subsequent to those not identifying him. 564 S.E.2d 383, 390-91 (Va. 2002).
390 See supra text accompanying notes 124-27. The court was aware of this argument, as ap-
pellant's excellent briefs cited to this important aspect of Rosenblatt See Opening Brief of Ap-
pellant at 5-6, Dean (No. 011154).
391 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 79-83.
392 See supra text accompanying notes 128-38.
393 Dean, 561 S.E.2d at 689 (emphasis added). The court also quoted the all inclusive small
group defamation dicta in Ewell, 121 S.E. at 914. Dean, 561 S.E.2d at 688. The court apparently
accepted this aspect of Appellant's argument, see the discussion in Opening Brief of Appellant
at 5, and rejected the vigorous attempt by appellee to portray appellant's claim as a some-or-
more-but-not-all case under Virginia law, citing dicta in Ewell, 121 S.E. at 914, and Restatement
of Torts § 564 (1938). Brief of Appellee at 13-17, Dean (No. 011154).
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jury to find for Baer "only if it found the libel was aimed at [him] or if
it found that the libel aimed at [him], along with a few others." '394
The Court replied that such a small group defamation instruction
"might not be objectionable," as "we do not mean to suggest that the
fact that more than one person is libeled by a statement is a defense
to suit by a member of the group. "9  The Rosenblatt Court, however,
could not "read the charge as being so limited" in light of the itali-
cized defect delineated above.396 Fourth, the Dean court was appar-
ently unfamiliar with the strong suggestions of the continuing liability
of the small group theory in New York Times3 7 and the Court's un-
doubted reliance on the small group theory in Garrison.
In sum, the Virginia Supreme Court's broad and erroneous inter-
pretation of Rosenblatt is inconsistent with both a detailed analysis
thereof and the Court's jurisprudence as a whole. Despite some
broad language therein, language relied on by the Dean court,399
Rosenblatt did not purport to disavow the strong intimations in New
York Times or the unequivocal reliance on the small group defamation
theory in Garrison.f° Had the Court so intended, Justice Brennan, the
author of all three majority opinions-New York Times, Garrison,
Rosenblatt-would have so stated. That he did not reinforces the ex-
traordinarily modest nature of Rosenblatt. The Court's subsequent
analyses of suits by governmental entities and members thereof and
its reliance on state common law to resolve "of and concerning" is-
sueso' further emphasizes Rosenblatt's limited sphere of influence.
The Court's strong predisposition against absolute immunity for
either the media or non-media entities or individuals 4 2 also strongly
39 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 82, n.6.
395 Id.
396 See supra text accompanying note 135.
397 See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
398 See supra text accompanying notes 79-90.
399 See Dean, 561 S.E.2d at 689; supra text accompanying notes 383-84.
4o See supra notes 397-98.
401 See supra text accompanying notes 146-77.
402 For discussion of New York Times, see supra text accompanying notes 16-29. For a discus-
sion of Garrison see supra notes 79-90. For a discussion of Rosenblatt see supra notes 141-45; see
also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989) ("We have
not gone so far... as to accord the press absolute immunity in its coverage of public figures or
elections."); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986) (discussing Gertz,
infra); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985) (finding, in a Petition Clause case, that a
letter to the President that was defamatory of a candidate for U.S. attorney was protected only
by New York Times); id. at 486-87 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that under New York Times,
there is no absolute privilege protecting expression that falls within the scope of the Petition
Clause); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 127 (1979) (rejecting the suggestion that either
history or the language of the Speech and Debate Clause created an absolute privilege for
defamation made outside the chamber of the House or Senate); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153, 169, 173, 176 (1979) (rejecting an absolute privilege against inquiry into the editorial
process as contrary to New York Times and its progeny); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
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augurs against absolute immunity for defamers who limit themselves
to disparaging small governmental entities rather than specifically
identified individual members thereof. As the Court has said, abso-
lute immunity "requires a total sacrifice of the competing value"403 re-
dressed by the law of defamation, including "our basic concept of the
essential dignity and worth of every human being, '"4 0 4 a view it has
"regularly found... an untenable construction of the First Amend-
ment.4 0 5 By contrast, the Court has repeatedly restated its preference
for the qualified constitutional privilege found in New York Times,0 6
widely perceived as "essentially protective, 40 7 of freedoms of expres-
sions and "an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement" to self-
censorship.4 °8
Viewed collectively, the Court's jurisprudence treats freedoms of
expression and redress of reputation under the law of defamation as
"equally compelling need[s]." 4 9  In essence, the Court imposes a
heavy burden of persuasion 41 on defendants attempting to extendeven the swathe of New York Times' qualified constitutional privilege.
323, 341 (1974) (noting that if self-censorship were the only issue, the Court "would have em-
braced long ago the view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and indefea-
sible immunity from liability for defamation").
403 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
404 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring), quoted in Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990); see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341; see also Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1991) (noting that defamation law had redressed
reputational injury since the late 16th century); Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 11 (same); Philadelphia
Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 782, n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that reputation is an "important
interest" recognized for over a thousand years); Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169 (finding that the inter-
est in reputation is a "basic concern").
405 Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176.
406 See supra note 402. In only "fair report" has the Court hinted at an absolute privilege. See
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976) (suggesting Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975), which accorded protection to true matters of public record, would apply to ac-
curate reports of false matters of public record). For a detailed analysis of this still not totally
resolved issue, see DAVID A. ELDER, THE FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE § 3:02 (1988) (detailing contra-
dictory and vague elements of First Amendment jurisprudence on whether fair and accurate
reports enjoy an absolute constitutional privilege); ELDER, supra note 2, § 3:17, at 58-60 (noting
the issue is "a difficult one" on which the Court has given "little guidance" and that the Time,
Inc. v. Firestone decision used accuracy and truth "as fungible concepts without apparently com-
prehending the important distinction between the two").
407 Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169; id. at 192 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (remarking that New York Times
provided "exceedingly generous standards").
408 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; see also Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 783 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("[T]he publisher must come closely to willfully blinding itself to the falsity of its utter-
ance."); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., 443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979) ("demanding burden");
Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 457 ("rather drastic limitations").
409 Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 456, quoted in Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 774.
410 For a development of this theme in detail and a suggested presumption of falsity and con-
stitutional malice in libel/false light hidden camera litigation, see David A. Elder et al., Establish-
ing Constitutional Malice for Defamation and Privacy/False Light Claims When Hidden Cameras Are
Used by the Newsgatherer, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 327 (2002).
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ar- 411In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the Court repulsed an attempt to extend
New York Times to all inaccurate reports of legal proceedings, regard-
less of plaintiffs status, as "effect [ing] substantial depreciation of the
individual's interest in protection from such harm, without any con-
vincing assurance" this was necessitated by the First Amendment. 4 12 In
Herbert v. Lando the Court replied similarly to defendants' attempt to
"erect an impenetrable" 41 3 barrier against inquiry into the editorial414
process to meet the requirements of New York Times or the lower
standard allowed private persons by Gertz: "The case for making this
modification is by no means clear and convincing.., we decline to ac-
cept it.
4 11
The Court's explicit, strong predisposition against expanding the
established substantive protections wrought by New York Times and
416Gertz-the burden of constitutional malice by all public persons as
to matters of public interest (and for presumed or punitive damages
for public or private individuals in matters of public interest'
411 424 U.S. at 455-58 (1976) (rejecting a narrower version as to what actually occurred in
the courtroom).
412 Id. at 456 (emphasis added).
413 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979).
414 Id. at 155-70.
45 Id. at 169-70 (emphasis added); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (rejecting all purpose or
general public figure status, stating that it "would not lightly assume that a citizen's participa-
tion in community and professional affairs rendered him a public figure for all purposes. Absent
clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of
society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life." (em-
phasis added)).
416 The Court's interpretations narrowly construe public figure status. See Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n., 443 U.S. 157, 165-69 (1979) (rejecting public figure status as to all con-
victed of criminality, holding that the rule would "create an 'open season' for all who sought to
defame persons convicted of crime"); id. at 169 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (interpreting the
majority as saying a vortex public figure becomes such only by "literally or figuratively
'mount[ing] a rostrum' to advocate a particular view"); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111,
133-36 (1979) (rejecting the suggestion that a federal grant recipient was a vortex public fig-
ure); Time, Inc., v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976) (finding that Palm Beach socialite
who was a participant in a divorce trial and held eleven press conferences was not a public fig-
ure); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 351-52 (finding that a prominent local attorney in a high profile
case was neither an all purpose or vortex public figure). The lower courts have not always fol-
lowed the Court's limited construction. See generally ELDER, supra note 2, §§ 5:9-5:11 (discussing
the Court's vortex public figure jurisprudence). The same narrow Court construction is true as
to the "public official" status. See supra note 145. The Court has reaffirmed this constrained
view of public officialdom. See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 119 n.8 (remarking that the Court had
not given "precise boundaries" to "public official" status but concluding it "cannot be thought
to include all public employees," however); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351 (finding that an attorney-
officer of the court was not a "de facto public official").
417 See Milkovich v. Lorain journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16, 21 n.8 (1990) (noting the applicability
of the New York Times and Gertz limitations on damages to the instant case); Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 774 (1986) ("[Elven when private figures are involved,
the constitutional requirement of fault supersedes the common law's presumptions as to fault
and damages."); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 162 nn.7-8, 168 (1979) (discussing historical
jurisprudence on the propriety of such a constitutional limit); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50 (basing
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plaintiffs' burden of proving material falsity as to matters of public in-
terest418 (with the concomitant partial subsumption of an opinion
privilege4 19 under the Court's interpretation of this burden as pre-
cluding liability as to matters not provable as probably false 20), pro-
tection for other forms of imaginative expression and hyperbole,4"
and independent assessment of the record on appeal to proscribe
"'forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression'"""-parallels its
refusal to give special First Amendment-based protection in matters
prudence on the propriety of such a constitutional limit); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50 (basing the
constitutional requirement on the need to reconcile state law on presumed and punitive dam-
ages with the demands of the First Amendment). As to private persons suing as to purely pri-
vate matters, however, compliance with New York Times is not required; state law standards con-
trol. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(reasoning that, because of the "reduced constitutional value" of speech concerning no public
interest, First Amendment concerns did not supercede the state's interest in awarding pre-
sumed and punitive damages). For a discussion of the impact of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. beyond
presumed and punitive damages see ELDER, supra note 2, § 6:11, at 70, stating "[The Court's]
broad distinction between matters of public and private concern suggests that none of the rules
engendered by Gertz would apply to purely private matter." Id.
418 See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (citing Philadelphia
Newspapers Inc., 475 U. S. at 775, for the rule of plaintiffs burden); Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 9 n.4,
16, 19-20 (declining to add an opinion/fact test to the analysis); Philadelphia Newspapers Inc.,
475 U.S. at 775-77 (reasoning that because "the burden of proof is the deciding factor only
when the evidence is ambiguous," the plaintiff's burden helps ensure protection of true
speech). Note that the shift of the burden of proof in the private person-public interest setting
was a very close call, with four dissenters willing to keep the burden of proving truth on the de-
fendant. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 475 U.S. at 782-83 (Stevens, J., with Burger, CJ., White,
J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As a corollary, truth is an absolute First Amendment defense as to
matters of public interest. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 475 U.S. at 777 (implying this col-
lorary from the importance of First Amendment protection of true speech); Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964) ("[T]he New York Times rule ... absolutely prohibits punishment of
truthful criticism."). See generally ELDER, supra note 2, § 2:3, at 17-21 (discussing the truth de-
fense and the First Amendment).
419 See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 17-23 (rejecting both a "wholesale defamation exemption for
anything that might be labeled 'opinion'" as an "artificial dichotomy" between fact and opinion
and the defendant-protective multi-factor test adopted in Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.
Cir. 1984)). The cases remain in a state of disarray despite the Court's attempt to rein in this
potentially open-ended doctrine. See generally ELDER, supra note 2, at ch. 8 (discussing the
Court's fact/opinion jurisprudence).
420 See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 ("[A] statement on matters of public concern must be prov-
able as false before there can be liability under state defamation law. .. ").
421 See id. at 17, 21 (describing such a type of speech as falling under constitutional limits and
defamation law); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48-50 (1988) (rejecting plain-
tiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, finding that a parody "interview" with
plaintiff depicting his "first time" as an incestuous inebriated encounter with his mother in an
outhouse was protected expression); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
283-86 (1974) (finding that "scab" was protected by federal labor law); Greenbelt Coop. Pub.
Ass'n. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970) (finding the use of "blackmail" was, in context, mere
.rhetorical hyperbole" regarding plaintiffs exercise of negotiating leverage).
422 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 17, 21 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)); see also ELDER, supra note 2, § 4:1, at 4-8 (discussing the Court's
requirement for appellate review).
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423 24 425 426 427fjursiction, discovery, etrial, idence, procedure, em-
ployer imputed fault/vicarious responsibility,428 allocation of fault-
finding responsibility,429 and damages430 (other than those imposed by
New York Times and GertZ431).
423 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.12 (1984) (rejecting any sugges-
tion the First Amendment's "invisible radiations" restricted jurisdiction acceptable under the
Due Process Clause). In Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-91 (1984), the Court rejected any sug-
gestion that the First Amendment limited plaintiff-California-domiciliary's right to sue therein
for a publication in Florida where "intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly
aimed at California." The Court found that "[i]nfusion of such [First Amendment] con-
siderations would needlessly complicate an already imprecise inquiry." Id. at 790. Because the
First Amendment had already been considered in imposing limitations on the substantive law,
to consider it again in the jurisdictional context would be "a form of double counting." Id.
4 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 155-77 (1979) (concerning discovery inquiry into
journalist's thoughts and conversations to prove constitutional malice); supra text accompany-
ini notes 413-15.
25 See Herber, 441 U.S. at 174 n.23 (rejecting a proposal for a bifurcated trial as to falsity,
then fault and injury, in part because the Court refused to subject libel litigation to "such bur-
densome complications and intolerable delays").
426 See id. at 155-72 (allowing plaintiff latitude to prove the "critical element" of constitu-
tional malice, rejecting any constitutional restrictions, citing the use of indirect or direct evi-
dence on issues of motivation or malice at common law). The Court's analysis "suggests that
more accurate results will be obtained by placing all, rather than part, of the evidence before
the decision-maker." Id. at 172-73; see also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc, v. Connaughton,
491 U.S. 657, 667-68, 684 (1989) (finding that, although issues of motivation and common law
malice were not alone sufficient for constitutional malice, they were, like other forms of circum-
stantial evidence, relevant evidence on the issue). For detailed analyses of common law malice
as strong probative evidence of constitutional malice, see ELDER, supra note 2, § 7:3, at 61-77,
and Elder, supra note 410, at 377-441.
427 See Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-91 (1984) (suggesting no special rules extended to summary
judgment in First Amendment cases); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 & n.9 (1979)
(expressing doubt about the suggestion that summary judgment "might well be the rule rather
than the exception" on constitutional malice cases); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 256 n.7 (1986) (interpreting these earlier statements as "simply an acknowledgment
of our general reluctance 'to grant special procedural protections to defendants in libel and
defamation actions in addition to the constitutional protections embodied in the substantive
laws'"). For a detailed analysis of Anderson see ELDER, supra note 2, § 7:6, at 84-89.
428 See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1974) (discussing publisher's
liability for employee-reporter's false statements in a newspaper article). This hugely important
development is analyzed in depth in ELDER, supra note 2, §§ 6:4, 6:10, 7:9.
See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 461 (1976) (stating that there is no prohibition
against an appellate court's making a finding of fault in the first instance of a civil case). "The
First and Fourteenth Amendments do not impose upon the states any limitations as to how,
within their own judicial systems, fact finding tasks shall be allocated." Id.
430 See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 522-23 (1991) (rejecting the incre-
mental harm doctrine); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774-81 (1984) (finding
that where defendant engaged in multi-state sales, it was required to anticipate plaintiff's search
for an extended statute of limitations-New Hampshire was the only state where the claim was
not time-barred-and was charged with notice of the possibility it might be assessed damages
throughout the country under the "single publication rule"); see also infra text accompanying
notes 453-54.
431 Even under Gertz, the Court broadly defined compensatory damages as not limited to eco-
nomic loss but as covering other "actual harm," such as "impairment of reputation and standing
in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." Gertz v. Robert
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In sum, the Court has made it clear that there is a need to "hold[
the balance true 43 2 between the "vital guarantee of free and unin-
hibited discussion of public issues, 433 and the "'important social val-
ues"' 434 on the opposite "side [of] the equation 4 3 5 and affirmed un-
ambiguously that the First Amendment can well "tolerate sanctions
against calculated falsehood without significant impairment of [the]
essential function [S] ,436 of freedoms of expression. In powerful, oft-
quoted language in Garrison, involving a criminal prosecution for in-
clusive defamation of a small group of eight judges, the Court elo
quently reaffirmed that "calculated falsehood"-the knowing or reck-
less falsehood43 -is beyond the pale of the First Amendment and "at
odds with the premises of democratic government."4 39 Other Court
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Later, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the Court dis-
avowed any suggestion that the First Amendment required proof of reputational impairment
before mental distress damages could be awarded, 424 U.S. at 460-61. Some state cases impose
such a threshold as a matter of state law. See ELDER, supra note 2, § 9:2, at 12-16 (noting sev-
eral such state cases). Also note that the Court rejected any suggestion that a heightened stan-
dard of fault above and beyond that for compensatory damages is required for punitive dam-
ages. Id. § 9:5, at 29-30 (discussing Gertz). The Court recognized the peculiar competence and
"wide experience" of trial courts in framing instructions on damages. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
432 Milkovich v. Lorainjournal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990).
433 Id. at 22.
4M Id. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)).
435 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 22.
436 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
437 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 66 n.2 (1964); see supra text accompanying notes 79-
80.
'38 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75.
439 Id. ("At the time the First Amendment was adopted, as today, there were those unscrupu-
lous enough and skillful enough to use the deliberate or reckless falsehood as an effective po-
litical tool to unseat a public servant or even topple an administration."). See Harte-Hanks Com-
munications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 687, n.34 (1989) (quoting Garrison);
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 487 & n.1 (1985) (Brennan,J., concurring) (quoting Garri-
son, 379 U.S. at 79). For a powerful example of the lessons taught by New York Times and Garri-
son, see People v. Stanistreet, 58 P.3d 465 (Cal. 2002), where the court unanimously upheld
misdemeanor convictions under the California statute proscribing the making of knowingly
false accusations of misconduct against police. Citing extensively to New York Times and Garrison
(and noting that the statute was more exacting in absolving complainants of reckless false-
hood), the California Supreme Court rejected the contention the statute violated First
Amendment precedent on content discrimination, referencing the greater potential injury
from such complaints. Id. at 469-71. In other words, the legislature could criminalize know-
ingly false charges against this class of officer victims but could not, for example, criminalize
only knowingly false racial profiling allegations. Id. at 472. More broadly, the court said, "[iun
our country, we do not expect, and the Constitution does not require us to tolerate, knowingly
false statements of fact." Id. at 473. Their statement was not overbroad, as it did not apply to
"more casual speech." Id. at 473-74. Accordingly, the offense was more like perjury, a felony.
Id. The court noted the cases invalidating another statute that provided a civil action for defa-
mation by a police officer against a complainant who filed a complaint with plaintiffs employer
charging incompetency, misconduct or criminality if the charge was knowingly false and made
with "spite, hatred, or ill will," but also said they had been "weakened" by reliance on partially
overruled (on jurisdictional grounds) precedent. Id. at 474 & n.6 (quoting a section of the
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precedent has emphasized the compensatory,"" vindicatory,"' and de-
terrent 2 nature of damage liability, acknowledged in powerful and
unequivocal terms the right of a state to use its laws to "discourage
the deception of its citizens" ' by falsehoods, and warned against "the
poisonous atmosphere of the easy lie [that] can infect and degrade a
whole society.' '4
California State Civil Code). See, e.g., Walker v. Kiousis, 114 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 83-89 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that the statute, which accorded police officers an exemption from the
statutory absolute privilege applicable to official proceedings, violated the First Amendment
prohibitions on content-based restrictions, that is, by "selectively target[ing] only
speech ... critical of peace officers"). It is extremely doubtful the Walker line of cases survives
Stanistreet.
440 See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516 (1991) ("'[T]he legitimate
state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm in-
flicted on them by defamatory falsehood.'" (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
341 (1974))); Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 12, 22 (citing "redress for harm" from false statements one
of the principles guiding defamation law); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S.
767, 773 (1986) ("Any analysis must also take into account the 'legitimate state interest... [in]
the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood.'"
(quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341)) (alteration in original); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 172
(1979) (citing compensation as an "aim" of defamation law); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86
(1966) (pointing to compensation as one of the "important social values which underlie the law
of defamation").
441 See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 12 (noting the role of vindication as a basis for the development
of defamation law); Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 93 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[A]n action for dam-
ages is the only hope for vindication or redress the law gives to a man whose reputation has
been falsely dishonored.").
4 See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 172 ( "Those who publish defamatory falsehoods... are subject to
liability, the aim being. . . to deter publication of unprotected material threatening injury to
individual reputation."); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350 ("[Punitive damages] are private fines levied by
civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."); Rosenblatt, 383
U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing deterrence as another "important social value[ I"
underlying defamation law).
443 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984). The Court quoted the state's
criminal defamation statute and held that the state had a legitimate state interest in protecting
against the harm to the previously anonymous non-resident plaintiff. Id. at 776-77 & n.6; see
also Illinois ex. rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assoc., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003) (upholding
unanimously the right of the state to go after knowing affirmative misrepresentations in fund-
raising, stating broadly "the First Amendment does not shield fraud," relying in significant part
on libel precedent); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967) (rejecting absolute
immunity for free expression and noting newspapers had "'no special immunity from the appli-
cation of general laws.' ... Federal securities regulation, mail fraud statutes, and common-law
actions for deceit and misrepresentations are only some examples [of those laws]" (citation
omitted)). On the liability of media defendants for illegalities and tortious acts in newsgather-
ing, see ELDER, supra note 324, § 2:18.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 475 U.S. at 782 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenblatt,
383 U.S. at 92-94 (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 734
(1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment is not a shelter for the character assassi-
nator .... The First Amendment does not require that we license shotgun attacks on public
officials in virtually unlimited open season. The occupation of public office holder does not
forfeit one's membership in the human race.").
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In interpreting the dictates of the First Amendment in the post-
New York Times era and the Gertz counter-revolution, 5 the Court has
repeatedly reaffirmed the continuing vitality of the common law
44
1
and the historical content44 7 and significance of common defamation
principles and privileges. 448  For example, in Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine Inc.,44  the Court vigorously rejected any special First
Amendment rules for quotations in assessing truth and falsity and
adopted the common law of substantial truth/material falsity.15 The
Court further rejected a "rational interpretation 5 1 standard in inter-
preting quotations attributed to plaintiff-as a "near absolute, consti-
tutional protection" that would "ill serve" 2 First Amendment val-
ues-and held that the incremental harm doctrine was not mandated
by the First Amendment.453 What was defamatory of a plaintiff was
held to be purely a matter of state law.454
Viewed against the Court's powerful preference for New York Times
(and concomitant liability for "calculated falsehood"), the case for an
expansive proscription of liability based on the small group
445 See Elder, supra note 24, at 660 ("Gertz and its progeny.., reflect a basic realignment of
the competing interests of reputation and free expression.").
446 See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 514-17 (1991) (rejecting a suggestion
of any alteration other than in syntax or grammar constituted a falsity, the Court adopted the
historical sense of substantial truth, with non-liability for minor or insignificant variances); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 & nn.18-20 (1984) (citing
the "common-law heritage" of the New York Times rule and thejudge's "especially broad role" in
applying it and the close analogy of such cases to the English precedent on the tort of deceit);
id. at 510 (noting that New York Times "emerged from the exigency of deciding concrete cases; it
is law in its purest form under our common-law heritage"); Herbert, 441 U.S. at 161-62 (adopt-
ing the "deeply rooted" common law rule of permitting state-of-mind evidence on issues of pu-
nitive damages in the context of proving constitutional malice); id. at 163 (relying in part on
the forfeiture by "malice" rules of the common law antedating New York Times); supra text ac-
companying notes 7-13, 150-62, 169-77. Note that in Masson the Court relied on in major part
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 563 cmt. c (1977). The Court has relied on the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts in other cases. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 13 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, cmt. a (dealing with opinion)); Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774 n.3, 777 and
n.8 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A ("single publication" rule)).
47 See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482-84 (1985) (finding its common law qualified
privilege decision of 1845 controlling as to the meaning and content of the Petition Clause in a
case involving a nominee for U.S. Attorney); supra text accompanying notes 169-77.
448 See McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482-84.
449 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
450 Id. at 510, 514-17, 524-25. In modern times, the burden of proving falsity is usually on
the plaintiff. See id. at 517 (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.); see also supra note 418. Note the
Court used the impact on the "reasonable reader"/"reasonable trier of fact" standard in distin-
guishing material from immaterial variances. Masson, 501 U.S. at 515-17, 522, 525 ("[W]ords
and punctuation express meaning. Meaning is the life of language.").
451 Id. at 518-20.
465 Id. at 520.
453 Id. at 522-23. The Court noted that California could adopt this doctrine as a matter of
state law on issues of damages, causation, or injury calculations. Id. at 523.
4 Id. at 522.
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defamation theory is exceedingly weak. Consider the following hy-
potheticals:
-A trash talk radio host (from the right or left) specifically im-
putes acceptances of bribes while in office to all living former presi-
dents and the current President;
455
-A member of the bar or law professor imputes corruption in a
,456specific case to the state supreme court;
-A citizen stands in the middle of the town square and holds a
placard charging that the mayor and town council are "controlled by
the mob; 
457
-A citizen detained in the town jail in Mayberry claims to have
been raped during a blackout-only Andy, Barney, and Goober were.... 458
in and around the jail during the blackout;
-A public university student charges university trustees with fla-
grantly violating the open meeting law to conceal illegalities and
gross improprieties.
-A small number of law professors at a public university defame
their male or female colleagues (a group of fewer than twenty-five) as
creating a "pervasive hostile environment."
46
Explicit charges, fully inclusive of a small group, and the offended
public official sues, alleging that the defendant published with "actual
malice"6'-knowing or reckless disregard by clear and convincing evi-
dence'S-and further alleges common law malice, as did Officer463...
Dean. What compelling arguments of public policy justify an "im-
penetrable barrier" 4 based on the broad prohibition of the small
group theory espoused by the Virginia Supreme Court in Dean v.
455 The group of six includes President George W. Bush and former Presidents Bill Clinton,
George Bush, Ronald Reagan,Jimmy Carter, and Gerald Ford.
456 Cf Ryckman v. Delavan, 25 Wend. 186, 200-01 (N.Y. 1840) ("But suppose, in the course of
such general invective against those who administer our laws, a charge of corrupt and partial
decision in a particular case to have been made against 'all the present judges of the Supreme
Court.' Is not this to the common understanding of men as clear as if Judges Nelson, Bronson
and Cowen were distinctly named?"); supra text accompanying notes 79-90 (discussing Gari-
son). But cf Owens v. Clark, 6 P.2d 755, 759-60 (Okla. 1931) (holding, in a 5-4 opinion, that a
libel of "certain members" of the state supreme court libeled no individual member thereof). It
is doubtful, however, that Owens remains good law. See supra note 330.
457 Cf supra text accompanying notes 294-304.
458 Under Dean v. Dearing, the difference between three and five to eight people would be
meaningless. Presumably, if only Andy and Barney were on duty, neither could sue. The illogic
of such a conclusion is breathtaking.
459 Cf supra text accompanying notes 297-304; infra note 473.
:60 Cf supra text accompanying notes 319, 322, 327.
61 Opening Brief of Appellant at 2-3, Dean v. Dearing, 561 S.E.2d 686 (Va, 2002) (No.
011154); Appellant's Appendix at 6, Dean (No. 011154).
462 Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 25-27, 402.
46 Opening Brief of Appellant, at 2-3, Dean (No. 011154) ("evil intent"); Appellant's Ap-
pendix at 6, Dean (No. 011154).
464 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979); see supra text accompanying notes 413-15.
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Dearine. Surely not the specter of seditious libel. Harry Kalven elo-
quently postulated that "the presence or absence in the law of the
concept of seditious libel defines the society. A society... [that]
makes seditious libel an offense, is not a free society .... His ar-
gument is compelling, perhaps irrefutable, in the context of a civil
suit or prosecution by a federal, state, or local governmental body, or
maybe even by a large group of government employees collectively 
66
defamed. These cases may involve the direct or indirect use by the
government of its deep pockets and sometimes vast resources to in-
timidate and silence its citizen-critics,4 7 and, in any event, closely par-
allel seditious libel. But the latter are a far wilderness cry from the
individual member of a small group retaining private counsel to sue
for disparagement of his or her individual reputation against a per-
son or entity 68 alleged to have acted-like Dearing--with both consti-
tutional and common law malice.466
The First Amendment provides no protection for crackpots, calcu-
lating liars, purveyors of sourceless rumor, "purposeful avoid [ers] of
truth," and a myriad of others who engage in disseminating "calcu-
lated falsehood., 4 1 It boggles the mind and makes the First Amend-
ment look like Dickens's proverbial ass471 to protect the fabricator
who does incalculable calculated injury by the consciously predeter-
mined ploy of winking, blinking, and nodding but naming no names
when all but the clueless know or can easily find out who was tar-
geted. Only in the never-never-world of First Amendment jurispru-
dence would such warped logic even be contemplated. It boggles the
mind to think of the artificial distinctions that will arise and the artifi-
cial line-drawing that will be necessitated by a distinction between
small group governmental entities and non-governmental entities.
The individual trustees of a public university could not sue while
465 Kalven, supra note 5, at 205.
466 See supra text accompanying notes 30-65, 187-368.
467 See supra text accompanying notes 202-07, 218-19.
46 See supra text accompanying notes 238-40, 288-333.
469 Opening Brief of Appellant at 2-3, Dean (No. 011154); Appellant's Appendix at 6, Dean
(No. 011154). A special prosecutor later found no evidence of wrongdoing by any present or
past officer of the Elkton Police Department. Appellant's Appendix at at 28-29, 61, Dean (No.
011154). Note that common law malice is an additional requirement in most states for punitive
damages, ELDER, supra note 2, § 9:6, at 33-34, which is authorized but not required by the First
Amendment. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-53 (1974) (differentiating
between the common-law malice requirement and the constitutional "actual malice" con-
straint).
470 Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692 (1989).
47 For a detailed analysis of the case law on constitutional malice, see ELDER, supra note 2, at
ch. 7.
472 CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST ch. 51 ("'If the law supposes that' said Mr. Bumble ....
'the law is a ass-a idiot.'").
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those of a private university could.475 The lawyers in a small city law
office could not sue, but the members of a candidate for attorney
general's law firm could.474  A small group of public high school
teachers accused of improprieties with students could not sue, but,
on the same allegations, the English faculty at a private high school47"5
could. And what constitutes a governmental entity or group? A
jury?476 A group of independent contractors with the government?
7
Furthermore, within the clearly governmental sector is the Dean rule
limited to those who, like police officers of all kinds 47 are generally
held to bepublic officials? Or does it apply to garden variety public
employees¢ ° not likely to be deemed public officials under Rosenblatt
(for example, the mechanics at a small police garage or the nurses at
a small government clinic)? The quagmire unleashed by Dean is, in-
deed, one whose "outer boundaries ... are difficult to perceive. 4 8 if
the Dean rule applies in the mere public employee, non-"public offi-
cial" scenario, the defendant is self-catapulted from liability for negli-
gently disseminating defamation 482  into the realm of absolute
473 See Levert v. Daily States Pub. Co., 49 So. 206, 206-08, 211 (La. 1909) (allowing a member
of the board of trustees of Tulane University to sue for an imputation of scandal to the board of
trustees, and concluding that the libel "impeached the integrity of every individual member
who participated in the proceedings"). The Court noted that the trustees were persons of
"more or less prominence in the community" with "well known" connections to the University.
Although, unnamed, plaintiff-trustee was "necessarily one of its objects, and it must have been
so understood by those who knew that he was a member of the board." Id. at 211.
474 See Boyce & Isley PLLC v. Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893, 900-01 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (uphold-
ing a claim by the unnamed lawyers in a firm of four); supra note 130.
475 See supra text accompanying note 327.
476 The status ofjurors as "public officials" is unclear. Compare Macon Telegraph Publ'g Co.
v. Elliott, 302 S.E.2d 692, 695 (Ga. 1983) (implying that plaintiff-petit juror was a private indi-
vidual), with Standke v. B.F. Darby & Sons, 193 N.W.2d 139, 142-45 (Minn. 1971) (holding
grand jurors subject to New York Times as "public officials," "public figures," or matters of "public
interest"). Note that the latter was issued prior to Gertz's repudiation of the subject matter test
in favor of a status approach to applying the New York Times standard or Gertz's negligence mini-
mum. See supra note 150.
477 The better reasoned cases involving independent contractors have not treated them as
"public officials." See Elder, supra note 24, at 640-43. The cases are not uniform, however. See
id. at 634-37. As to "public figure" status of such, most independent contractor cases have fol-
lowed Hutchinson v. Proxmire. 443 U.S. 111, 133-36 (1979) (finding that plaintiff independent
contractor did not have "such access to the media that he should be classified as a public fig-
ure"). See supra note 417; see also ELDER, DEFAMATION, supra note 2, § 5:22, at 170-75 (discuss-
ing government contractors).
478 See ELDER, supra note 2, § 5:1.
479 This has been criticized. See id.; Elder, supra note 24, at 636-37 & nn. 287, 675-78.
480 See Elder, supra note 24, at 622-25, 640-43, 659-79; ELDER, supra note 2, § 5:1, at 24-33, §
5:24, at 177. It would be difficult to justify a dichotomy between private persons receiving a
public paycheck and those receiving a paycheck from private sources. Indeed, this might raise
equal protection problems.
481 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979) (cautioning against an editorial process im-
munity of defamation defendants); see supra text accompanying notes 413-15.
482 For an extended discussion of Gertz, see ELDER, supra note 2, at ch. 6.
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immunity---a constitutional deux pas 4 8 achieved by slyly disparaging a
small governmental entity or group but not naming names. It bog-
gles the mind.
CONCLUSION
No support exists in the jurisprudence of the Court, lower court
precedent, fundamental fairness, public policy, or common sense for
the potentially open-ended abuse of reputation envisioned by the
court's decision in Dean. The Seventh Circuit's analysis in Saenz v.
Playboy Enterprises, Inc.,454 again seems particularly apt. Rejecting the
district court's reliance on New York Times-Rosenblatt to bar libel by
implication, the court held that a publisher could not "trammel a
public official by 'surreptitious and insidious implication' under the
pretense of governmental critique."48 5 The court continued:
To deny a public official the opportunity to demonstrate the defamatory
innuendo of a publication, even one critical of governmental conduct, is
to open Pandora's Box from which countless evils may spring. A legal fic-
tion denying the existence of clearly discernable, though not explicit
charges [or the Dean scenario of defamation of the entity rather than the
specific individual member thereof], exposes public officials to baseless
accusations and public mistrust while promoting an undisciplined brand
of journalism (or public discourse by public officials such as Dearing]
both unproductive to society and ... unprotected by constitutional con-
siderations. 6
Clearly, New York Times' tough standards impose devastating ob-
stacles to redress by public officials attempting to vindicate their
reputations, leaving many deserving individuals 87 skewered on the
high altar of negligence-is-never-enough4 s To ratchet up defen-
dants' protection to the level of absolute immunity by the calculatedly
devious ruse of maligning a small governmental collective is uncon-
scionable. Think of the Officer Deans of the world and the countless
others in small towns, villages, and hamlets, elected and unelected,
who are known by name, face, and reputation by all. That is the
nature of small town life. When a community leader, the local
483 By this subterfuge defendant jumps from negligence over reckless disregard to absolute
immunity! For the author's criticism of the same attempted deux pas in the context of the
highly dubious doctrine of "neutral reportage," particularly as applied to private persons, see
ELDER, supra note 2, § 3:27.
484 841 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
485 Id. at 1317 (citation omitted).
486 Id.
487 SeeGertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974) ("[Many] deserving plaintiffs,
including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the
New York Times test.").
488 See ELDER, supra note 2, at ch. 7, § 7:2.
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newspaper, or any citizen-critic imputes specific charges of criminality
and corruption to the police force, the city council, or the like, the
local populace knows who the targeted individuals are-the trial court
conceded as much in Dean.489 These small town police officers and
officials are highly visible members of society-this is especially true
of those who wear a uniform and a badge and carry a weapon. Their
reputations are important to them and society,490 as recognized by the
fact that most state constitutions specifically protect this basic inter-
est.49' Leaving them and their reputations hanging in Dearingesque
effigy, remediless against the small group defamer, would make them
"but gilded loam or painted clay."4  They deserve better. The First
Amendment is not and should not be a bar to holding the defamer
liable if New York Times' "mighty fortress 4 93 can be surmounted.
489 See supra text accompanying note 376.
490 See supra text accompanying notes 403-04, 409, 434, 440-44.
491 See Comment, Defamation and State Constitutions: The Search for a State Law After Gertz, 19
WILLAMETE L. REV. 665, 665 n.2 (1983).
:92 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING RICHARD II, act 1, sc. 1, fine 179.
93 Andrews v. Stallings, 892 P.2d 611, 629 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (Hartz, J., specially concur-
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